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Over twenty years after the Sixth Circuit held that a bisexual public employee 
could be dismissed for coming out, courts remain split on the question of constitutional 
protection for gay coming-out speech. In addressing that question, this Article begins 
with a more fundamental one: What is the legal harm of suppressing coming-out speech? 
This Article suggests that a distinct legal harm follows from whether one conceives of 
coming-out as “persuasive,” “creative,” or “descriptive” speech—establishing a 
framework that applies to all minorities whose status is not readily apparent. Arguing that 
courts and scholars have adopted persuasive and creative conceptions of the value of 
coming-out, respectively, this Article advocates a descriptive conception: That coming-
out is legally significant because it functions, in the context of the political process, as 
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While the United States Constitution protects us, to varying degrees, from 
discrimination on the bases of race, religion, sex, national origin, and disability, that 
protection is meaningless if we are restricted from acknowledging our particular status 
within each of these categories. If a light-skinned person of color does not speak, she may 
be presumed to be white; if a Jewish person does not speak, he may be assumed to be 
Gentile. Speech is required to assert and claim numerous identities: “I am black,” “I am 
Arab,” “I am transgender.” Self-identifying speech, because it makes us susceptible to 
discrimination, is often the first casualty of that discrimination. The question of legal 
protection for self-identification affects us all: everyone has an identity that is physically 
invisible, everyone can pass.1 In this paper, I address the paradigm modern example of 
self-identifying speech: coming out as gay, lesbian, or bisexual.2  
The presence of openly gay people has begun to transform institutions of every 
kind. At the same time, many of these institutions have attempted to discourage their 
members from self-identifying as gay. The U.S. military’s policy of discharging 
servicemembers who come out as gay is well publicized and often debated. Less often 
discussed is the response of public employers to employees who come out on the job. 
Can government employers fire these employees? In 1984, the Sixth Circuit, the highest 
federal court to address the question, held in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District 
that “a bisexual public employee constitutionally may be dismissed for ‘talking about 
it.’”3 But in the modern constitutional age, is speech such as “I am gay” entitled to special 
protection in the workplace?4 Over twenty years after Rowland, courts have still not 
definitively resolved the question of whether coming-out speech is constitutionally 
protected. 
That constitutional protection depends on a more fundamental, and yet poorly 
theorized, question: What is the harm of suppressing coming-out speech? In Part I, I 
suggest that the harm of suppression depends on which of three conceptions of the role of 
coming-out speech one chooses to adopt. I begin with the work of linguistic philosopher 
J.L. Austin, suggesting that speech generally can serve three functions, often 
simultaneously: “persuasive,” in attempting to affect the thoughts or feelings of the 
listener; “creative,” in engendering a promise, a bet, or another social contract or 
obligation; and “descriptive,” in stating a neutral and verifiable fact.   
                                                 
1 “Passing means the underlying identity is not altered, but hidden.” Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 
Yale L.J. 769, 772 (2002). 
2 For the sake of simplicity, I use the term gay elsewhere in this paper to refer to gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals. 
3 Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1012 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
4 While some scholars have posed this question and speculated as to the answer, none have 
addressed it in detail. See Yoshino, supra note 1, at 833 (“[I]f that underlying status is unproblematic, then 
why does identifying it make it problematic?”); id. at 834 (“[S]o long as there s a ‘right to be’ a particular 
kind of person, I believe it follows that there is a ‘right to say what one is’”). Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, 
Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 218 (“[I]t cannot be a crime 
simply to be who you are.”). 
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Through both narrative and historical analysis, I illustrate that coming-out speech 
possess Austin’s three dimensions. I first elaborate a “persuasive conception” of gay self-
identification. Consider, for example, an individual who comes out as a way of 
responding to a homophobic comment. This individual states “I am gay” primarily for the 
purpose of convincing another person of the necessity of gay equality. While the words 
she utters are “I am gay,” her intent is both affirmation of homosexuality and a plea for 
gay equality. I then elaborate a “creative conception” of gay self-identification, ascendant 
in the initial act of coming-out, and its subsequent encapsulation in the narrative of the 
coming-out story, told and retold throughout many gay peoples’ lives. I suggest that in 
this context, an individual declares (and re-declares) her sexuality to create an identity 
around her same-sex sexual attraction—coming out in this way actually constitutes her 
gay identity. Finally, I elaborate a “descriptive conception” of gay self-identification: 
That an individual might come out simply to report an otherwise hidden alternative 
sexual orientation.  
In Part II, I focus on the “persuasive conception” of coming-out speech in legal 
discourse. Through a review of four disparate areas of law, I argue that this view of 
coming-out speech is judicially dominant. While coming-out may influence some to 
support gay equality, it may also provoke an emotional or hostile reaction in both those 
who are and are not swayed—thus the persuasive conception has two interrelated 
components: the positive persuasive and the negative disruptive effect. Thus conceived of 
as advocacy, the harm which flows from suppressing coming-out speech is the First 
Amendment harm of stifling public discourse. The legal remedy invoked by courts 
worried about the negative disruptive effect of coming out is the First Amendment’s 
public employee speech doctrine, and by those worried about the pure positive persuasive 
effect, the expressive association case law embodied by Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston. I conclude that the harm of suppression under 
this conception is insufficient to provide theoretical grounds for protection: because of 
both its disruptive effects and its affirming message about homosexuality, the persuasive 
conception can sometimes be correctly applied to quash gay self-identification. 
In Part III, I examine the “creative conception” of coming-out speech, arguing 
that it has emerged as law-and-sexuality scholars’ response to the judicially dominant 
persuasive conception, which is ineffective at protecting coming-out speech. Under a 
creative conception, the harm that flows from the suppression of coming-out speech is the 
erasure of gay status itself. I argue that such a conception theoretically provides complete 
protection for the speech itself: if gay status is protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, so too should the speech that constitutes that 
status. The harm enacted by restrictions on the creative conception is prohibited under the 
classification strand of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet, turning to a more practical 
analysis, I suggest that this harm will never be correctly recognized by courts. I conclude 
that a creative conception too will be ineffective at protecting self-identification. 
In Part IV I propound a new theory, a “descriptive conception” of coming-out 
speech, the third and least explored category suggested by Austin’s theory. Although this 
view of coming-out speech is the simplest, it is currently entirely absent from the debate. 
I argue that, under a descriptive conception, coming-out speech plays a central role in the 
democratic political process. I accept Bruce Ackerman’s contention that, contrary to the 
familiar Carolene Products framework, discreteness and insularity are bargaining 
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advantages in a modern pluralist democracy. These advantages follow from what I term a 
discrete and insular minority’s increased “political legibility” vis-à-vis invisible and non-
insular minorities. For homosexuals and any invisible, non-insular minority—what 
Ackerman calls “anonymous and diffuse” minorities—self-identification is the means of 
becoming politically legible. I outline a community’s Fourteenth Amendment right to 
equal political participation, suggesting that under a descriptive conception, restricting 
self-identifying speech implicates the gay community’s right because it disadvantages 
gay people in comparison with minorities who already enjoy heightened political 
legibility, usually by virtue of their physical visibility. I ultimately endorse a descriptive 
conception of coming-out speech, arguing that unlike either a persuasive or creative one, 
it is both a stable theoretical ground for protecting self-identification and is likely to be 
adopted by courts.   
 
I. Three Conceptions of Coming-Out Speech 
A. J.L. Austin’s Tripartite Theory of Speech 
In exploring the different effects of coming-out speech, I begin with J.L. Austin’s 
theory of speech acts. In a printed compilation of his lectures, How To Do Things with 
Words, Austin theorizes about the different functions of words or phrases. Austin initially 
proposes a binary classification model, suggesting that all speech is either “constative” or 
“performative.” Constative speech states a fact that is either true or false:5 “The chair is 
red” or “His hair is blond” are examples of constative declarations—they are 
independently verifiable statements of fact. On the other hand, performative speech is 
speech “in which by saying or in saying something we are doing something.”6 By saying 
the statements “I promise” or “I bet,” we engage in the acts of promising and betting, 
respectively.7 In contrast to the constative, these statements do not simply describe an 
independently existent reality, but rather create that to which they refer.  
However, Austin ultimately rejects the premise that all speech can be categorized 
as either constative or performative.8 Such a model is unworkable because many 
statements do not fit neatly into either the constative or the performative box. A statement 
such as “There is a bull in the field” might be either constative, in describing the presence 
of a bull—similar to the statement “There is a tree in the field,”—or performative, in 
creating a warning—similar to the statement “I warn.” (We can hear this difference if we 
read aloud the sentence “There is a bull in the field” with or without an exclamation 
point.)  
Austin’s resulting tripartite model of speech incorporates this realization that 
every statement has elements of both the constative and performative. He suggests that all 
statements have three aspects: “locutionary,” “illocutionary,” and “perlocutionary.” 
                                                 
5 J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 1 (2d ed. 1999) (1975) (Constative speech 
“describe[s] some state of affairs, or . . . state[s] some fact, which it must do either truly or falsely.”) 
(quotations omitted). 
6 Id. at 12. 
7 Id. at 94-98. 
8 Id.at 91 (explaining that “it is often not easy to be sure that . . . an utterance is perfomative or that 
it is not” and “mak[ing] a fresh start on the problem.”). 
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While each of these aspects of speech is always present, the balance between them 
changes. Thus, while all speech possesses each characteristic, different words or 
phrases—or the same ones, said in different contexts—will rate markedly higher on one 
of these three dimensions.  
First, speech describes: What Austin terms the “locutionary” capacity of speech is 
its basic function of communicating the meaning of the words themselves to describe a 
reality that is otherwise verifiable. This dimension is, in substance, much like a constative 
classification. In the statement “The book is red,” speech’s descriptive or locutionary 
aspect is ascendant. Similar to constative declarations, such phrases are simply statements 
of fact. 
Second, speech creates: What Austin calls the “illocutionary” capacity of speech 
is its ability to bring some intangible thing into being. This dimension is, in substance, 
much like Austin’s performative classification. Rather than describing any previously 
existing thing, these declarations actually create that to which they refer. In the 
performance or creation of a warning (“I warn” or “Look out!”), a promise (“I promise” 
or “I swear”), or a bet (“I bet” or “I wager”),9 the creative or illocutionary aspect of 
speech is ascendant.  
Third, speech persuades: What Austin identifies as the “perlocutionary” capacity 
of speech is its effect on the feelings or thoughts of the listeners—in his words, “what we 
bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, [or] 
deterring,” whether intended or unintended.10 In shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater, 
the persuasive or perlocutionary aspect of speech is ascendant. While we can imagine the 
word “fire” being heavily descriptive in another context—“Look, what a pleasant fire,” 
say—here the effect is primarily to induce fear and panic, causing people to flee the 
theater. 
 
B. Coming-Out Speech Under the Tripartite Model 
 Throughout the history of the gay rights movement, individuals and factions have 
at different times invoked the three characterizations of gay self-identification suggested 
by Austin’s work. The words “I am gay” have been alternately characterized as an 
attempt to persuade, to create, or to describe. 
1. The Persuasive Conception 
Coming out is often used persuasively, to convince individuals to recognize the 
need for gay equality. What Austin calls the “perlocutionary” act,11 we might think of 
generally as a focus on the effect of the speech on the feelings or thoughts of the listeners, 
whether intended or unintended. This focus on the effect of self-identification 
encompasses the positive as well as the negative—including, for example, both the ability 
of coming-out speech to challenge people’s stereotypes about homosexuals and promote 
                                                 
9 Id. at 94-98. 
10 Id. at 101, 109. 
11 Id. at 109 (defining “perlocutionary acts [as] what we bring about or achieve by saying 
something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring”). 
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gay equality (to “br[ing] to our side” family and friends12), and its capacity to provoke 
hostility and disruption. There will inevitably be uncertainty about whether the positive 
(affirming) or negative (disrupting) effects of gay self-identification predominate under a 
persuasive conception.13 
A person instinctively relies on this dimension of coming-out speech when, for 
example, he responds to a homophobic comment by coming out to the commenter. 
Coming out in this way is intended to force the listener to reconcile abstract homophobic 
words or beliefs with a real person. It is through this conception, for example, that we 
understand the impact Justice Powell’s now notorious closeted gay clerk might have had 
by coming out to the Justice prior to the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.14 And when a 
Catholic priest, responding to the Catholic Church’s recently proposed restrictions on gay 
priests, comments that the silence of “gay priests, like myself, [who] have been prevented 
from speaking about our own experiences,” “only breeds prejudice, fear and hatred,”15 he 
is invoking a persuasive conception. By coming out, he suggests, priests could promote 
equality, comfort, and acceptance for gay people.  
In the 1970s, many members of the gay community adopted such a conception to 
argue that coming out was the best way to end gay oppression.16 This conception can be 
seen in the shift in the names adopted by gay activist groups, from the disguised 
“Mattachine Society” to the out “Gay Liberation Front.”17 There was “no talk among 
these new activists of disguising their mission with ambiguous titles—no homophile, no 
Mattachine, no Bilitis”18—only the sense that merely by being out and visible, equality 
for gays would increase.19 Scientific studies have since confirmed their underlying 
instinct that, by revealing oneself to be homosexual, one positively affects the opinions of 
close friends regarding homosexuality and gay rights.20 
In these situations, while an individual actually says “I am gay,” the intended 
meaning is closer to, “I’m here, I’m queer, get used to it”21 and “Gay is good.”22 I call 
                                                 
12 EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGEWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 70-71 (1990). 
13 This is in part because of the nature of the perlocutionary effect of any statement—Austin 
himself admits that the task of determining that effect is fraught with uncertainty. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 
122 (“[J]udges should be able to decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary . . . but not what 
perlocutionary acts were achieved”).  
14 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521-22 (1994). 
15 Paul Michaels, Don’t Dare to Speak its Name, THE TABLET (Britain), Sept. 24, 2005, available 
at http://www.thetablet.co.uk/cgi-bin/register.cgi/tablet-01084 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
16 Yoshino, supra note 4, at 816-18. 
17 DUDLEY CLENDININ & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD THE GAY 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 31 (1999) (noting that before the formation of the Gay Liberation Front, 
“no other major homosexual rights group had used the word ‘gay’ in its name . . .  [and] few even dared to 
use the word ‘homosexual’”). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 32 (quoting the Gay Liberation Front’s Statement of Purpose as saying: “We are going to 
be who we are.”). 
20 Gregorgy M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, “Some of My Best Friends”: Intergroup Contact, 
Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians, 22(4) Personality & 
Social Phycology Bulliten 412-24 (1996). 
21 This was one of the slogans popularized by the short lived pamphlet Queer Nation, begun in the 
summer of 1990 by Michaelangelo Signorile. See also The Simpsons, Jaws Wired Shut, epidsode DABF05 
(Group: :chanting: We’re here, we’re queer, get used to it! Lisa: You do this every year, we’re used to it! 
 8
this understanding of the way coming out is spoken and received, the “persuasive 
conception” of gay self-identifying speech—an account that emphasizes the persuasive 
effect that self-identification has on others in convincing them of the need for gay 
equality. Under this account, self-identification plays a crucial role in achieving gay 
rights.   
2. The Creative Conception 
The phrase “I am gay,” rather than simply describing an identity which already 
exists, can also be thought of as creating that identity. In the same way that statements 
such as “I promise” or “I bet” bring an intangible agreement into being—what Austin 
terms the statements’ illocutionary capacity—coming-out speech can be seen as 
constituting the speaker’s gay identity. In declaring their homosexuality an individual 
establishes a gay identity not only in the minds of those to whom they reveal their 
sexuality, but also in themselves. 
The creative conception is embodied in the coming-out story—the personal 
narratives through which openly gay individuals tell and retell of their initial acceptance 
and declaration of a gay or lesbian identity.23 Consider the adolescent who does not even 
know words to describe the same-sex attraction she feels. In learning, embracing, and 
then uttering the words “I am gay” or “I am lesbian,” she places herself within a larger 
community. Coming-out stories often begin with the speaker fearing that he is the “only 
one in the world,”24 yet by publicly acknowledging her sexuality the speaker has 
necessarily grown past this fear and realized that she shares sexual characteristics with a 
larger community.  
 We can conceptualize the act of identity creation as the “ontological shudder” that 
passes through individuals when they declare their homosexuality for the first time.25 It is 
this change that writers of coming-out tales have variously described as an “instance of 
illumination”26 and as “power.”27 In these situations, while an individual actually says “I 
am gay,” her actual meaning is more akin to “I am out therefore I am.”28 I call a narrow 
focus on self-identifying speech as creating gay identity the “creative conception.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Guy: Spoil sport!). “Out of the Closets and into the Streets” is another Queer Nation slogan similarly 
founded on the idea that outness a requirement for successful gay activism.  
22 This slogan was coined by activist Frank Kameny in the summer of 1968. 
23 Coherence in Coming-Out Stories, in QUEERLY PHRASED: LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND 
SEXUALITY 287, 290 (Anna Livia & Kira Hall, eds., 1997) (“[T]he existence of the coming-out story is 
evidence that individuals do manage to incorporate gay ness into their identities.”); id. at 294 (“That 
coming-out stories exist at all and are recognized by members indicates their centrality in defining a gay 
identity as well as a gay culture.”). 
24 Bonnie McElhinny, Language, Sexuality and Political Economy, in LANGUAGE AND 
SEXUALITY: CONTESTED MEANING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 111, 125 (Kathryn Campbell-Kibler, et al., 
eds., 2002). 
25 Yoshino, supra note 1, at 826 (“This may explain the transformation - a kind of ontological 
shudder - that some gays describe on intoning these words for the first time.”). 
26 Introduction, BOYS LIKE US, at xvi (Patrick Merla, ed. 2002).  
27 Adrienne Rich, Foreword, in THE COMING OUT STORIES xi, xii-xiii (Susan J. Wolfe & Julia 
Penelope Stanley eds., 1980) (“I have an indestructible memory of walking along a particular block in New 
York City, the hour after I had acknowledged to myself that I loved a woman, feeling invincible. . . . I knew 
my life was decisively and forever different; and that change felt to me like power.”). 
28 DOUGLAS CRIMP & ADAM ROLSTON, AIDS DEMO GRAPHICS 103 (1990). 
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3. The Descriptive Conception 
Just as gay self-identification has creative and persuasive aspects, so too does it 
have a simple descriptive aspect: Coming out serves to reveal an individual’s 
homosexuality. What Austin calls the “locutionary” dimension of speech is its basic 
function in communicating the meaning of words themselves to describe a reality that is 
either true or false. This aspect of self-identifying speech allows an individual to report 
an otherwise invisible personal characteristic. In this basic sense, the statement “I am 
gay” conveys a piece of information about a person and operates much like the statement 
“The book is red.”  
 This conception of coming out is invoked, for example, when an individual is 
already out and is simply describing her sexuality. Under this account, when an 
individual says “I am gay,” it is heard as “I am gay”—as a revelation of fact, as identity-
reporting. The descriptive aspect of self-identification is stable: While the balance 
between self-identification’s creative and persuasive effects varies depending on the 
context of the revelation, every act of self-identification is necessarily descriptive. I call 
an emphasis on coming-out speech as merely reporting a homosexual identity the 
“descriptive conception.”  
C. Three Links Between Speech and Status 
Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will explore each of the previously 
articulated conceptions of self-identifying speech—persuasive, creative, and 
descriptive—as adopted in legal discourse. While legal scholars continually rely on 
Austin’s initial binary classification in assessing self-identifying speech,29 none have 
employed the three-part model that he ultimately endorsed. These conceptions each 
provide a basis from which to address the lingering question in judicial opinions and legal 
scholarship regarding the nature of the link between gay self-identification and gay 
status.  
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting from the Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, bring this question to the fore. 
The plaintiff in that case, Marjorie Rowland, was a high school guidance counselor who 
was dismissed after telling several colleagues that she was bisexual and had a female 
lover30; her dismissal was upheld by the Sixth Circuit. In attempting to separate the free-
speech-based liberty interest from the equal protection interest, the circuit court remarked 
in apparent frustration that “it is impossible to tell whether the . . .  plaintiff was 
suspended and transferred merely for being bisexual or for talking about it.”31  
                                                 
29See, e.g., Jennifer Minear, Note, Performance and Politics: An Argument for Expanded First 
Amendment Protection of Homosexual Expression, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 601, 623 (2001) 
(relying on Austin’s distinction between constative and performative speech in assessing self-
identification).  
30 In special verdict part VIII(1) and VIII(5) the jury concluded that Rowland would not have been 
suspended and that her contract would have been renewed had she not come out as bisexual. Rowland v. 
Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444, 460 (6th Cir. 1984). 
31 Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 1984) 
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The Justices provide the obvious answer: Both—she was dismissed “because she 
is bisexual and revealed this fact.”32 Brennan and Marshall recognize that Rowland’s 
statement of sexuality is entangled with her homosexual status—and thus, any First 
Amendment analysis of gay self-identification will necessarily blur with a Fourteenth 
Amendment inquiry. They emphasize that “petitioner’s First Amendment and equal 
protection claims may be seen to converge because it is realistically impossible to 
separate her spoken statements from her status,”33 recognizing that Rowland’s 
termination fundamentally threatened “her right both to be what she was and to state the 
fact.”34 This proposition is at first somewhat confusing—after all, Rowland had been 
living with her partner openly as a lesbian for years. Other plaintiffs make this same 
confusing shift: In defending his decision to speak about his sexuality, one plaintiff 
argued, “I have every right to be what I am”35 (rather than, “I have every right to say 
what I am”).  
How is these plaintiffs’ right to be homosexual threatened by the suppression of 
their speech? The answer to that question follows from the realization that self-
identification has three distinct dimensions. A focus on any one aspect of coming-out 
speech—persuasive, creative, or descriptive—provides a starkly different understanding 
of the importance of that speech in relation to gay status. The suppression of each 
dimension of gay self-identification corresponds to a distinct status-based harm. And 
each of these conceptions, and the distinct harm which follows from its suppression, is 
necessarily met by a separate constitutional remedy. 
Scholars and courts have failed, first, to perceive that these three aspects of gay 
self-identification coexist and, second, to attribute any significance or devote any 
discussion to self-identification’s descriptive aspect in particular. As a result, their 
analysis of coming-out speech often reflects a narrow focus on either the creative or the 
persuasive aspect. (In this sense, they ignore one of the broad lessons of Austin’s work, 
that speech, including coming-out speech, cannot be exclusively categorized.) I will 
argue that distinct segments of the legal community—courts and scholars—have 
embraced the persuasive and creative conceptions, respectively, while the third has been 
left unacknowledged.  
In the remaining three Parts, I address each of self-identifying speech’s three 
dimensions: first articulating a legal remedy to respond to the status-harm that follows 
from its suppression, then determining whether the remedy completely responds to the 
harm, and finally predicting whether the remedy has or is likely to be correctly adopted 
by courts. Through an account of the current state of the law, in Part II, I will argue both 
that the persuasive conception is currently dominant in case law and that it can be 
correctly applied to quash gay self-identification. Under this account, an individual’s 
right to be homosexual is threatened by restrictions on self-identification because of the 
crucial role self-identification plays in achieving gay equality. This emphasis can be seen 
running through public employee speech doctrine, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” public school 
censorship, and parade case law, in that these bodies of law all concentrate on the 
                                                 
32 Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added). 
33 Id. at 1016 n.11 
34 Rowland, 730 F.2d at 453 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
35 Acanfora v. Board of Education, 359 F. Supp. 843, 846 (D. Md. 1973). 
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reaction of third parties to gay self-identification. With a focus on the parade case law, 
specifically Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston,36 I 
suggest that courts may be correct not to protect self-identification on some occasions 
when the persuasive dimension of the speech is ascendant. 
Scholars have responded to courts’ narrow focus on the reaction of third parties, 
as I explain in Part III, by adopting a creative conception—yet this conception, too, will 
fail to protect self-identification. There exists a strong theoretical ground for protection: 
Under this account, because of self-identification’s role in constituting an individual’s 
gay identity, restrictions on self-identification directly threaten the existence of that 
identity and thus, I argue, find complete constitutional protection. Yet, because it is based 
on a subtle distinction between status and speech, I suggest that this theory is unlikely to 
be adopted by the courts. 
In Part IV I propound a new theory, which both protects coming-out speech more 
completely than the persuasive conception and is more likely than the creative conception 
to win favor in the courts—namely, the descriptive conception. The simplest account, 
which emphasizes the descriptive aspect of self-identifying speech as merely revealing a 
homosexual identity, has been absent from the legal debate. The stable nature of self-
identification’s descriptive effect makes the descriptive conception a convenient, easily 
applicable model—it is peculiar that neither a majority opinion nor any legal scholar has 
ever endorsed it. 
 
II. The Persuasive Conception of Gay Self-Identifying Speech in Law 
 
The California Supreme Court, in Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., remarked 
that gay self-identification is most significant when it acts persuasively, “to dispel the 
false public opinion that gays [are] timid, weak and unheroic figures.”37 Legal scholars 
addressing gay self-identification have also largely adopted this framework, conceiving 
of the value of self-identification as the political act of directly increasing homosexual 
visibility and acceptance.38 For John Hart Ely, for example, gay self-identification serves 
to “neutralize our prejudices.”39 Ely illustrates his point with a hypothetical declaration: 
“‘Hold it, Lester, I’m gay, and my wrist’s not the least bit limp.’”40 Underlying Ely’s 
account is the notion that coming out is legally significant primarily for its persuasive 
effects.41  
                                                 
36 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
37 Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1049 (Cal. Ct. App., 1984) 
38 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay 
and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 89-90 (1998) (“[C]oming out is often considered an 
important—indeed necessary—political goal.”); Jennifer Minear, Note, Performance and Politics: An 
Argument for Expanded First Amendment Protection of Homosexual Expression, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 601, 622 (2001) (“[H]omosexuality is today essentially a form of political . . . dissent . . . .”) 
(quoting Brent Hunter Allen, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for an 
Expanded Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1089-90 (1994)).   
39 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 162 (1980). 
40 Id. at 163. 
41 See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71, 74 (1993). Catharine MacKinnon 
argues that words such as “nigger” and “cunt” persuade others to regard African Americans and women in 
a negative light, contributing to the disproportionate poverty of African Americans, and the 
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The persuasive conception embraces—indeed, emphasizes—the overlap between 
gay self-identification and gay advocacy. Scholars of sexuality and law who have 
adopted this framework are quick to embrace the idea that “to come out is to implicitly, 
or often explicitly, affirm the value of homosexuality.”42 This overlap is succinctly 
captured in the Supreme Court’s use of the phrase “avowed homosexual” in Boy Scouts 
of America v. Dale, with its connotations of affirmation and promotion.43 (Other courts, 
in contrast, have used phrases such as “acknowledged homosexual[]”44 or “known 
homosexual,”45 which are much less suggestive of advocacy.) Modern courts which reach 
a pro-gay decision are more likely to refer to openly gay individuals without suggesting 
that they are advocates46—suggesting, as I will illustrate in detail in Section B, that under 
a persuasive conception self-identification fails to find protection. 
Current case law emphasizes a different, but no less accurate, aspect of the 
persuasive conception. Every act of gay self-identification presents the possibility of a 
hostile or disruptive reaction from coworkers or fellow servicemembers. Indeed, 
countless stories have suggested that even the positive perlocutionary effect of 
challenging homophobic stereotypes is emotional and disruptive47—that the positive 
transformation coming out works on the world has a concomitant destabilizing effect. 
 
A. Before Lawrence: The Rise of the Persuasive Conception  
The vast majority of case law on coming-out speech, while adopting a persuasive 
conception, focuses only such speech’s negative disruptive effects. This emphasis on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
disproportionate number of female prostitutes. MacKinnon’s argues for robust legal recognition of the fact 
that words can impact equality, both positively and negatively. At its core, her conception of speech is a 
primarily persuasive one.  
42 Nan Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1704 (1993) [hereinafter 
Hunter, Speech and Equality]; Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000) (criticizing courts for their “avoidance of acknowledging the 
message of self-worth inherent in self-identification”) [hereinafter Hunter, Expressive Identity]. 
43 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 646, 652, 655 (2000). “Avowed” is derived from 
the latin root advocare (to advocate). It is defined as “To acknowledge openly, boldly, and unashamedly” 
or “to state positively.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) 
(emphasis added).  
44 Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing that a soldier was 
discharged “solely because of his acknowledged homosexuality”). 
45 Acanfora v. Board of Education, 359 F. Supp. 843, 854 (D. Md. 1973). The case involved a 
teacher removed from his duties following his participation in a televised discussion of the “difficulties 
homosexuals encounter.” Id. at 500. However, Acanfora never self-identified on campus, but was rather 
unwillingly outed—“[t]he cause of the publicity was, in the immediate sense, independent of plaintiff’s 
speech.” Id. at 854. For the Acanfora court, his lack of an affirmative desire to identify as homosexual 
removes the suggestion of advocacy. In ordering him reinstated, the court emphasizes that Acanfora never 
“sa[id], here I am, a homosexual,” id. at 846., and thus “[Acanafora] did not advocate homosexuality” on 
campus, id. 
46 Compare Watkins, 875 F.2d at 701 (using “acknowledged homosexual,” finding for the gay 
plaintiff) and Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 854 (using “known homosexual,” finding for the gay plaintiff) with 
Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 (using “avowed homosexual,” finding against the gay plaintiff). 
47 Consider the “gay panic defense” cases, in which just such a disruptive and emotional reaction 
is used to explain and justify violence against homosexuals. See generally Kara S. Suffredini, Note, Pride 
and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279, 279 (2001). 
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provocative is rooted in the characterization of gay self-identification as incitement 
speech prior to the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.48 As the Court stated in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the First Amendment allows speech to be sanctioned “where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.”49 Until Lawrence, 
which ended the criminalization of homosexual sodomy, gay self-identifying speech was 
susceptible to the charge that it was a solicitation to perform a criminal act. Court 
decisions interpreting state statutes prohibiting criminal solicitation suggest that “I am 
gay,” said in the correct context, would be sufficient to constitute solicitation to commit 
sodomy.50 Even courts that reached pro-gay results acknowledged that self-identification 
was susceptible to this characterization,51 and often rejected the incitement argument only 
because the danger of lawless action, though clear, was not imminent.52  
The effect was to attach to the declaration “I am gay” a legally significant 
presumption of criminal activity. As one commentator noted, “[T]he implication of 
Bowers v. Hardwick was effectively to tar lesbians and gays as a social group as potential 
criminals,”53 and thus to tar a revelation of one’s homosexuality as a declaration of that 
potential criminality. In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor 
recognizes that “the word homosexual imputes the commission of a crime.”54 The 
statement immediately calls to mind the underlying act, just as the statement “I am a 
thief” calls to mind the act of stealing. To use the words of Nan Hunter, this link between 
statement and conduct represents a legal “focus on identity . . . as defined by conduct.”55 
As courts rearticulated the incitement arguments, they connected, and in fact defined, a 
statement of homosexuality as one of sodomy. 
This focus on criminal conduct has the effect of evoking in the listener a fear of 
potential disruption or even danger. Consider the potential perlocutionary effects of a 
declaration of criminal identity, such as “I am a thief:” fear, danger, and anxiety. The 
confluence between naming oneself a homosexual and naming oneself a criminal56 
                                                 
48 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
49 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous court, 
famously observed that “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See generally 
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN AND JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES – COMMENTS – QUESTIONS 3-
50 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the legal development of the carve-out in First Amendment protection of 
advocacy of illegal action). 
50 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schnarrs, 222 Pa. Super. 134, 137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972) (in 
determining whether solicitation for criminal sodomy occurred, intent is dispositive and “the intent may be 
inferred under the surrounding circumstances”) (interpreting Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4502 (prohibiting 
assault and solicitation to commit sodomy)).     
51 See, e.g., Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(reaching a pro-gay ruling in spite of the potential for incitement, noting that even “incitement of imminent 
lawless action is not bereft of constitutional protection”). 
52 National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education, 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973)) (“The First Amendment does not permit someone to be 
punished for advocating illegal conduct at some indefinite future time.”). 
53 Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE L.J. 97, 106 (2002) (quoting Nicholas Bamforth, 
Sexuality, Morals and Justice: A Theory of Lesbian and Gay Rights Law 37 (1997)).  
54 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583-84 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
55 Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1718 (1993). Professor 
Hunter, however, views this period as starting to wane in the 1970s. Id. 
56 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“The stigma this criminal statue imposes, moreover, is not trivial.”). 
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results in a legally significant presumption of disruption which has implicitly colored 
courts’ views of gay self-identification under the persuasive conception. 
 
B. The Dominance of the Persuasive Conception in Modern Case Law 
The historical emphasis on disruption, and more broadly, courts’ exclusive 
characterization of “I am gay” as persuasive speech, continues unchanged in modern self-
identifying speech case law. In this Section, I review three legal regimes for censoring 
self-identification—public employee speech, the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy, public high schools—to illustrate the dominance of the persuasive conception. 
At first blush, these regimes evince two systems of classification for silencing 
speech: that it is personal, and that it is disruptive. The larger story, however, suggests 
that these concepts meld together—that the classification of self-identification as personal 
is both a rationale for and a response to its disruptive effects on the listener. Self-
identification is labeled as something that ought to be kept personal because it is 
disruptive. At the same time, self-identification is seen as disruptive because it touches on 
private aspects of one’s sexuality. 
In reviewing these three areas of law, I will show not only that the persuasive 
conception is dominant, but also that it is pernicious for two central reasons—suggesting 
that courts should not tolerate the suppression of gay self-identifying speech due to 
disruption under a persuasive conception. First, gay self-identification is often disruptive 
solely because of the discriminatory reactions of colleagues and supervisors,57 and a 
persuasive conception hides too much about the motive for disruption and the resulting 
restrictions on speech. As judges have acknowledged, restricting self-identifying speech 
because of bias-based disruption legitimizes the underlying anti-gay bias.58 What’s more, 
through use of “personal” and “disruptive” classifications, the suppression of self-
identification becomes framed as desire to accede to a gay individual’s wishes, and to 
protect her. Couched in this sympathetic way, restrictions on self-identification are a clear 
instance of what Reva Siegel has called “preservation-through-transformation,”59 such 
that across these three contexts, the same restrictions on self-identification that have been 
in place for decades are preserved through a simple change in rationale. It is a persuasive 
conception which animates the placement of the onus for avoiding discrimination not on 
the audience but on the “disruptive” gay individual. 
                                                 
57 In the context of the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, Five Ninth Circuit judges 
dissenting in Holmes called coming out, “speech[] which . . . neither harms nor endangers anyone.” Holmes 
v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 155 F.3d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir. 1998). 
58 See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1289 (1998) (“Although the Constitution 
cannot control prejudices, neither this court nor any other court should, directly or indirectly, legitimize 
them.”); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1128 (11th Cir., 1997) (en banc) (Birch, J., dissenting) (“If the 
public’s perception is borne of no more than unsupported assumptions and stereotypes, it is irrational and 
cannot serve as the basis of legitimate government action.”); Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 
470 U.S. 1009, 1013 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasizing the difference 
between “statements that arguably had some disruptive effect in the workplace” and the “mention of a fact . 
. . that apparently triggered certain prejudices held by [a] supervisor.”). 
59 Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 
2117, 2178 (1996). 
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1. Public Employees 
More than twenty-five years ago, the California Supreme Court observed “that 
homosexuality is an affliction which the homosexual worker must conceal from his 
employer and his fellow workers.”60 Under the current public employee speech doctrine, 
we can understand this “must” as a legally sanctioned mandate. The state in its capacity 
as an employer cannot usually suppress an employee’s First Amendment right to free 
speech through the threat of dismissal.61 Yet this First Amendment protection is limited. 
The doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education62 and 
its progeny, most notably Connick v. Myers,63 outlines two requirements for the First 
Amendment protection of the speech of public employees: An employee’s speech must 
both be on a subject of public concern and be non-disruptive. The “public concern” 
requirement means that government employees can be terminated for statements of 
“personal interest,” whether made on or off the job.64 This threshold “public concern” 
inquiry has been difficult for gay plaintiffs to overcome, and as a result the Connick-
Pickering doctrine has not proven effective at protecting self-identification by gay 
employees.65 Employees continue to be reprimanded for even bringing up the subject of 
homosexuality.66 
In Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, recognized as the “highest 
existing authority”67 directly on the question of gay self-identifying speech, the Sixth 
Circuit held that gay self-identifying speech constitutes a valid basis for termination. 
When Rowland challenged her dismissal, the court analyzed her claim under the “public 
concern” prong of the Connick-Pickering test. It concluded that when self-identifying as 
bisexual Rowland “was speaking only in her personal interest”68 and thus that her 
revelation was not protected under the public employee speech doctrine.  
                                                 
60 Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488 (Cal. 1979). 
61 See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). If discharged for exercising her 
First Amendment right to free expression, an employee may be entitled to reinstatement. See Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84  (1987) (“[E]ven if [McPherson] could have been discharged for any 
reason or for no reason at all, she may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for 
exercising her constitutional right to freedom of expression.”). 
62 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
63 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
64 City of San Diego v. Roe, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 8165, *4 (2004); see also Pereira v. Commissioner 
of Soc. Servs., 733 NE 2d 112, 119 n.17 (applying Connick-Pickering analysis to a racist joke made by a 
Massachusetts Department of Social Services employee when speaking at a private dinner honoring 
outgoing city council members).  
65 See 10-168 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 168.08 (“In contrast with the type of public 
expression in these cases, the mere admission of homosexuality by a teacher is not ‘speech’ protected by 
the First Amendment . . . .”). This lack of protection, however, passes unacknowledged by at least one 
major sexuality and law textbook. See Eskridge & Hunter, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law 344 (suggesting 
that “[i]n general, [Pickering’s public employee speech] doctrine has protected gay employees,” but citing 
as example Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d. 304 (5th 1981), a case involving protection for gay 
advocacy). 
66 Collins v. Faith Sch. Dist., 46-2, 1998 SD 17, 8 n.2 (S.D. 1998) (reinstating a teacher who was 
terminated after presenting an objective description of oral and anal sex to his sex education class in 
response to a student question, but noting repeatedly that “his description of homosexual intercourse was 
ill-advised”). 
67 Yoshino, supra note 1, at 831. 
68 Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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Although it rejects Rowland’s claim for failing Connick-Pickering’s initial public 
concern requirement, the Rowland court in truth relies on the disruption prong of that 
framework. To support classifying the speech as personal, the court attributes that 
characterization to Rowland, explicitly relying on her own request for confidentiality 
regarding her sexual orientation.69 Yet Rowland’s request for privacy is more likely to 
indicate apprehension at her colleagues’ potential reaction than to suggest that “she did 
not consider her statements to be on matters of public concern.”70 Like many gay 
individuals in the workplace, Rowland herself gauged the potential disruption of her self-
identification, and as a result treated her sexuality as “personal.” By relying on her 
characterization, the Rowland court inadvertently relies on a disruption rationale even in 
the threshold public concern analysis.  
The only other court to directly address gay self-identification by a public 
employee reached a different result from Rowland. In Weaver v. Nebo School District,71 a 
Utah district court considered the claim of Wendy Weaver, a high school psychology and 
physical education teacher and volleyball coach. Weaver’s bisexuality, already the 
subject of some speculation in her workplace,72 was confirmed when she responded 
affirmatively to a volleyball team member’s question whether she was gay.73 Weaver was 
subsequently removed from her position as volleyball coach and instructed “not to make 
any comments, announcements or statements to students, staff members, or parents of 
students regarding [her] homosexual orientation,” even in settings outside of the 
classroom,74 on threat of “termination.”75  
In contrast to Rowland, the Weaver court declares this restriction on speech 
unconstitutional under Connick-Pickering, holding that Weaver’s self-identifying speech 
is on a subject of public concern. But Weaver is more significant for what it concedes: 
The school’s right to prohibit Weaver’s self-identification on campus was not even 
contested.76 The case’s limited scope is in tension with its seemingly pro-gay holding. 
The court is willing to classify Weaver’s self-identification as public, but only after 
Weaver has agreed that the term “public” will not include her workplace. By accepting 
Weaver’s own narrow definition of “public” the Weaver court echoes Rowland in silently 
incorporating into its holding a restriction on speech adopted by the plaintiff herself, one 
that most likely originates in the plaintiff’s fear of disruption.  
This reading of Weaver is reinforced by the court’s suggestion that the central 
error committed by the Nebo School District was not firing Weaver, but making her 
sexuality public. The court emphasizes that it was “the defendant [that] . . . . transmuted 
what should have been a private issue into a matter of public concern” through its 
                                                 
69 Rowland, 730 F.2d at 449. 
70 Id. 
71 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1285 (1998). 
72 Id. at 1281. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1282. 
76 Id. at 1285 (“[R]estrictions to speech made in the classroom . . . [is] a limitation that all parties’ 
now seem to agree would be reasonable.” ); id. at 1283 (“[T]he dispute centers on . . . whether the School 
District’s restrictions go beyond the classroom and unconstitutionally infringe on Ms. Weaver’s right to 
speak in public”). 
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reaction.77 Weaver, then, is subject to a criticism similar to that which Kenji Yoshino 
levels at Rowland—that “private” is operating as “an a priori normative concept that 
describes what ought to be kept private.”78 But Weaver and Rowland also describe the 
where—sexuality ought to be kept private at work—and the why—sexuality should be 
kept private because it is potentially disruptive and uncomfortable.  
In these opinions, sexuality is designated private not because the defendant-
employers “don’t want to hear it,” but because the plaintiffs “don’t want to say it.” The 
Rowland court relies on “Ms. Rowland’s request for confidentiality,”79 and the Weaver 
court, on Weaver’s “agree[ment] that . . . [she] may not speak about her sexual 
orientation in the classroom.”80 This reliance on the plaintiffs’ own desire appears to be 
progress, but should be understood as an instance of “preservation-through-
transformation”: Underlying both the desire not to speak and the desire not to hear is the 
same fear of disruption.  
The disruption inquiry is a crucial step in any Connick-Pickering analysis. Prong 
two of the balancing test instructs courts to weigh the value of the speech against its 
disruptive effect in the workplace. Considerations include the employee’s own 
performance, harmony between coworkers, discipline between supervisors and 
subordinates, regular operation of the agency, and public trust in the agency.81 One can 
readily imagine reactions to gay self-identification resulting from discomfort or 
homophobia registering on all these indices of disruption. Indeed, other scholars have 
criticized the public employee speech doctrine for failing to scrutinize the source of 
disruption.82  
2. Military Servicemembers 
The military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy also restricts self-
identification on the ground that it is potentially disruptive, but the military’s regime is 
both more explicit than the public employee speech doctrine in its focus on disruption 
                                                 
77 Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 (emphasis added). 
78 Yoshino, supra note 4 at 831 (emphasis removed) (emphasis added). The Court, in City of San 
Diego v. Roe, recently entrenched this blurring of what is in fact personal with what ought to be personal by 
articulating the public concern requirement in terms of “legitimate news interest,” something “of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public.” City of San Diego v. Roe, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 8165, *11 
(2004). The case involved a police officer who was terminated after his employer discovered sexually 
explicit videos for sale online which depicted the employee stripping and masturbating while wearing an 
unofficial police uniform. Although the Ninth Circuit found the video-speech protected in that it took place 
“off-duty and away from his employer's premises, and was unrelated to his employment,” City of San 
Diego v. Roe, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 8165, *4 (2004).  Roe was “not a close case” in failing to meet this “public 
value” standard, and thus Pickering’s threshold inquiry. Id.  
79 Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984). 
80 Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1283 (1998). 
81 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (mentioning discipline by superiors, 
harmony among coworkers, performance of the speaker’s duties are considerations in gauging disruption) 
(citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 570-73 (1968)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
151 (1983) (mentioning discipline, morale, harmony, and efficiency) (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 
134, 168 (1974) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
82 Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1007, 1019 
(“The core of the employee's free speech right is entirely dependent on the likely reaction of co-workers 
and the public to the employee's speech.”). 
 18
and more revealing about what lies at the heart of that disruption. DADT has been called 
the “harshest regime in U.S. law for penalizing coming out speech.”83 The statute 
provides that “[a] member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed 
forces”84 if that “member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words 
to that effect.”85 This restriction has been found to include statements such as “I am gay,” 
“I am homosexual,” or “I am lesbian.”86 
Under DADT, just as under the pre-1993 complete ban, gay self-identification is 
effectively grounds for separation from the military. But DADT is narrowly tailored in 
ostensibly targeting only the “telling” of sexuality. The “unit cohesion” argument, that 
openly gay soldiers will disrupt the close working relationship among soldiers necessary 
for effective combat, is routinely advanced in support of the policy. The perceived effects 
of self-identifying speech lie at the core of the “unit cohesion” argument. Neither courts87 
nor the military itself88 deny that homosexuals have always served. It is not the presence 
of homosexual soldiers, but rather their self-identification as such, that leads to 
disruption. As one U.S. general noted, “A statement [of homosexual orientation] alone 
will cause disruption within the unit.”89  
                                                 
83 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW (2d ed. 2004). 
84 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000). 
85 Id. § 654(b)(2) (emphasis added). The statute is actually worded such that it does not 
categorically ban all coming out speech, exempting such speech in the case of “a further finding . . . that the 
member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a 
propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.” 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2). This should 
nonetheless be regarded as a complete ban for two reasons. First, as many scholars have argued, in practice 
the presumption created by self-identification is nearly irrebuttable, and thus operates in practice like a 
complete ban. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 932 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he military may 
reasonably assume that when a member states that he is a homosexual, that member means that he either 
engages or is likely to engage in homosexual conduct.”) (quoting Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 686 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994)); Yoshino, Covering, supra note 4, at 828 & n.332 (stating that “[a]s a practical matter, this 
presumption has proved very difficult to rebut,” and collecting cases in support of that proposition).   
Second, to the extent that an exception does exist, the sort of speech allowed by 10 U.S.C. § 
654(b)(2) is gay self-identification which is shown in some sense to be insincere—under which, for 
example, an individual lacks all desire to engage in intimate homosexual acts. See AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 
14-17 (describing abuses of certain speech acts such as “when I say ‘I promise’ and have no intention of 
keeping it,” and calling such statements as “insincere” and “hollow”). The statute only allows gay self-
identifying speech when, in effect, there is evidence that the self-identification at issue doesn’t function in 
same important ways that gay self-identification normally does, see discussion infra Section I.B (outlining 
the three dimensions of gay self-identification), rendering the exception meaningless in remedying the 
harm of such suppression.  
86 Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1294 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The DoD has interpreted the phrase 
‘statement that a member is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect’ to include statements such as 
‘I am a homosexual,’ ‘I am gay,’ ‘I am a lesbian,’ and ‘I have a homosexual orientation.’”) (citing 
Department of Defense Directive 1332.30, encl. 8, at B.4.b.). 
87 See, e.g., Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1286 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds 155 
F3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is not aimed at the separation of homosexuals based on status alone.”). 
88 See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Shower/Closet, 20 ASSEMBLAGE 80 (1993) (quoting an ex-Navy 
Captain as saying that “‘we all know’ that ‘we’ve been able to live with homosexuals in our military quite 
well.’”); ABC NEWS, May 19, 1992 (“[G]ays in the military, . . . of course exist[].”). 
89 Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings on S. 1298 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 595-96 (1995) at 821 (statement of John P. Otjen, U.S. General). 
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In the military’s model, the source of disruption is straight servicemembers.90 The 
regime highlights the fact that disruption due to gay self-identification stems not from the 
content of or motivation for the speech (since gay status is legally permissible) so much 
as the fact that it was spoken. In this way we can understand DADT’s prohibition on 
asking as well as telling. Direct questioning of a servicemember’s sexuality is 
prohibited91 not because of homosexual status but because of a belief in the necessity of 
suppressing the communication of homosexual status. (In this regard the regime is more 
consistent than that contemplated in Weaver: In that case, the plaintiff was directly asked 
about her sexuality by a volleyball team member but then disciplined for providing a 
truthful answer.92)  
3. Public School Students 
Public school administrators use a strikingly similar rationale to the military’s to 
prohibit gay self-identification by students. In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the 
Supreme Court famously noted that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”93 But Tinker has had limited 
effectiveness in protecting gay self-identifying speech because it articulated limits on any 
First Amendment expression that substantially interferes with school discipline. Schools 
can, and have, offered countless reasons why disruption might follow a student’s self-
identification, most obviously citing fears of verbal or physical harassment when a 
student “flaunts” his sexuality.94  
Many high school officials continue to silence the self-identification of gay 
students, often effectively, because they anticipate negative reactions from non-gay 
students. Missouri high school student Brad Matthewson was disciplined when he came 
to school wearing a t-shirt that read “I’m gay and I’m proud,” was forced to turn the shirt 
inside out, and was prohibited from wearing it again.95 The justification offered—much 
like in the DADT context—was potential disruption rooted in the reaction of peers: The 
shirt was “offensive, and distracting to other students.”96 Similarly, North Carolina high 
school student Jarred Gamwell was recently prohibited from hanging campaign signs for 
                                                 
90 Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the 
Case of “Don’t Ask, Don't Tell,” 108 Yale L.J. 485, 553 (1998) (“[T]he justifications for ‘don't ask, don't 
tell’—unit cohesion, privacy, and sexual tension—primarily focus not on the gay servicemember but on the 
straight servicemember.”). 
91 Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1287 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Applicants for enlistment, 
appointment, or induction shall not be asked or required to reveal whether they are heterosexual, 
homosexual or bisexual.”). 
92 See discussion accompanying note 73. One of the advantages of DADT contemplated by 
President Clinton was that through its prohibition on “asking,” soldiers would no longer be required to lie.  
93 393 U.S. 503 (1969). On the subject of sexual expression in schools, see generally Sean P. 
Greene, Discussion and Expression of Gender and Sexuality in Schools, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 421 (2002) 
94 See, e.g., Matthewson, Memorandom in support of prelimanry injunction *3 
95 ACLU Sues Missouri High School for Censoring Gay Student, at 
http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=17071&c=106 (last visited May 17, 
2005).   
96 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Matthewson v. 
Webb City School District, November 27, 2004 at *1. 
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student government elections that explicitly indicated he was gay. 97 The administration 
claimed such identification was “disruptive of the educational process” and thus fell 
within its “‘right to control and censor speech,’”98 and a state court agreed.99 
Admittedly, the threat to openly gay students in today’s public schools is not 
insignificant:100 Jamie Nabozny was verbally and physically harassed throughout his 
three years in a Wisconsin public high school for being openly gay,101 eventually 
withdrawing.102 In this light, restrictions on self-identification couched in the interest of 
protecting gay students seem reasonable. And yet this protection rationale is 
perniciousness in the same way as those which animate the public employee and military 
contexts: Homophobia underlies both the disruptive reaction of fellow students and the 
response by administrators. In Nabozny v. Podlesky, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged 
that homophobia served as the basis for the lack of reaction by school officials to the 
harassment of Jamie Nobozny: As the school’s principal told Nabozny, “if he [is] ‘going 
to be so openly gay,’ he should ‘expect’ such behavior from his fellow students.”103 
Homophobia on the part of school administrators underlies their insistence that gay 
students remain silent (rather than simply reprimanding their attackers). 
 
*  *  * 
 
I have argued that when gay self-identification is disruptive, it is so only because 
of the homophobic biases of colleagues—that it is not, in any sense, what we might think 
of as “inherently disruptive” speech.104 I concede that in certain scenarios it may be 
objectively reasonable for an employer, officer, or administrator to conclude that there 
will be a negative reaction to gay self-identification.105 To the operator of a business 
                                                 
97 See letter from Leslie Cooper, Staff Attorney, ACLU, to Bill Williamson, Principal, James 
Baxter Hunt Jr. High School (Apr. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=15537&c=106 (last visited Sept. 30, 
2005) (noting that the campaign signs read “Queer Eye for Hunt High” and “Gay Guys Know 
Everything!”);  
98 Michael Winerip, On Education; Officials Vote for the Closet at Hunt High, N.Y. TIMES, May 
5, 2004, at B11. 
99 See id. (observing that the ACLU challenged the removal in state court and lost). 
100 Amy Lovell, Comment, “Other Students Always Used to Say, ‘Look at the Dykes’”: Protecting 
Students from Peer Sexual Orientation Harassment, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 623 (1998) (“[S]tudies show 
that a substantial percentage of queer youth are harassed in regard to their sexual orientation. . . [and] 
suggests that student-to-student sexual orientation harassment is a frequent occurrence in American 
schools.”). 
101 Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Nabozny decided not to ‘closet’ his 
sexuality, and considerable harassment from his fellow students ensued.”). 
102 Id. at 452. 
103 Id. at 451. 
104 By this I mean speech to which a failure to react results from irrationality or doubts about the 
statement’s accuracy. Paradigm examples of this type of speech are incitement speech and “fighting 
words”; both can be restricted under current First Amendment doctrine. See WILLIAM COHEN, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION AND CONSCIENCE 67 (2003) (describing the 
categories of “low value” speech).  
105 Cf. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677 (U.S., 1994) (suggesting that the court “consider[] 
the reasonableness of the employer’s conclusions” regarding the context and effect of the employee’s 
statement). 
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concerned with “harmony among co-workers,” or “close working relationships,”106 an 
officer concerned with “unit cohesion,” or a principal concerned with school order, the 
hostile reaction of others to the identification of a gay colleague is disruptive within the 
traditional meaning of the word. Yet courts should not tolerate any regime which 
attempts to suppress self-identification due to its negative disruptive effects.  
By restricting speech under this aspect of the persuasive conception, courts 
legitimize the underlying discriminatory views. In the highly structured employment, 
military, and education contexts, there are less severe methods than complete 
restriction—such as targeted discipline or punishment—for controlling and limiting 
disruption. A public employer, for example, can leverage the threat of termination against 
the audience as well as the speaker. In the case of self-identification, because the root of 
disruption is so clearly bias, the cost of eliminating that disruption should fall on the 
audience. Coworkers, other servicemembers, and classmates could all be reprimanded 
effectively to quash disruption, rather than singling out the speaker alone.107 
 
C. Parades: Legitimate Restrictions on Self-Identification Under a Persuasive 
Conception 
While most case law on gay self-identifying speech focuses on the negative 
disruptive effects of such speech, a few contexts focus on the pure, positive persuasive 
effects. As an example, consider the contexts of parades: Unlike the employment, 
military, or education contexts, a parade organizer who restricts gay self-identification 
does not do so because of the negative persuasive effects—that is, out of a fear of 
disruption—but out of recognition of and disagreement with the positive persuasive 
effects—the normative claim for gay equality embodied therein. In the parade context, 
the same rationale used by John Hart Ely and the Calfornia Supreme Court in Sipple in 
arguing for the protection of self-identification becomes a rationale for its suppression. In 
such contexts courts can sometimes correctly rely on a persuasive conception of self-
identification to quash coming-out speech. 
It is a persuasive conception that animates the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, which upheld a 
St. Patrick’s Day parade organizer’s right to exclude members of a gay group from 
marching in the parade under a banner identifying their sexual orientation.108 Gay 
marchers can, and did, march—openly gay legislator Elaine Noble marched, unidentified, 
in the same St. Patrick’s Day parade decades earlier.109 The Hurley Court acknowledges 
that it is the self-identification of gay marchers in the parade, through their banner, that 
expresses the view “that people of [homo]sexual orientations have as much claim to 
unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals.”110 Embracing a persuasive conception of 
that statement, the Court takes this equality claim as part of the message of “I am gay.” 
                                                 
106 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (U.S. 1987). 
107 Gamwell, for example, describes an incident of harassment as a result of his self-identification, 
and notes how the student was subsequently suspended.  
108 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
109 Matthew Brelis, From Closet to Campaign Trail, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 1998, at E1. 
110 Id. at 574. The sense that self-identification constitutes advocacy is clearly evident in many 
newspapers which covered the controversy surrounding the Irish-day parade. See, e.g., Ana Puga, High 
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Under the persuasive conception, because the Court understands “I am gay” as 
advocacy for gay equality—as “Gay is good”—the Hurley Court is arguably correct in 
permitting that declaration to be restricted in the context of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day 
parade. Unlike the contexts discussed above, a parade organizer cannot completely 
counter the positive persuasive effect of self-identification except through suppression. 
And unlike a neutral statement regarding one’s status, a normative claim about the 
acceptability of homosexuality is a viewpoint with the potential to disrupt another 
speaker’s message. 
Under a persuasive conception suppressing gay self-identification is sometimes 
reasonable. However, a narrow focus on the persuasive aspect of self-identification is 
itself unreasonable: A consideration of all three distinct aspects of gay self-identification 
is required to determine whether such speech is protected. Thus I turn in the next Part to a 
consideration of the legal remedy for the suppression of the creative aspect of self-
identification. 
 
III. The Creative Conception of Gay Self-Identifying Speech in Law 
 
Legal scholars have argued that restrictions on the right to gay self-identification 
threaten one’s right to be homosexual, and these scholars embrace in part the idea that 
self-identification creates identity. This creative conception is primarily a scholarly one, 
and it should be understood as the academic reaction and alternative to the judicially 
favored persuasive conception. Many scholars have emphasized the creative aspect of 
gay self-identification in articulating its importance. Judith Butler,111 Janet Halley,112 Nan 
Hunter,113 and others114 begin with the premise that “[s]elf-identifying speech . . . [i]s a 
major factor in constructing identity.”115 A strong version of the creative conception 
views homosexuality as one of “the identities whose existences are contingent upon 
expression.”116 For these theorists, the value of self-identification is foremost as an 
illocutionary act, in creating one’s gay identity.  
As I elaborate in Section A, speech creates identity not all at once but through a 
complex series of social interactions—it thus depends on a recognition of the continuous 
nature of gay self-identification. By threatening its formation, restrictions on the creative 
aspect of self-identification threaten gay identity itself. I thus argue in Section B that 
coming-out speech, under a creative conception, finds protection under the First 
                                                                                                                                                 
Court Says Veterans Can Bar Gays from Parade, Boston Globe, June 20, 1995 at 1 (calling GLIB’s 
message “sexual-political” and paralleling it to “signs saying ‘queers should die’”). 
111 See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997). 
112 See Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument 
from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994). 
113 See Nan Hunter, Speech and Equality, supra note 42, at 1704. 
114 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay 
and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 116-124 (1998) (arguing that the law should view gay 
coming out as a major factor in identity construction).  
115 Nan Hunter, Speech and Equality, supra note 42, at 1718; see also Yoshino, supra note 1, at 
836 (“Sometimes self-identifying speech can constitute one’s identity.”). 
116 Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
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Amendment’s prohibition on coerced speech, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate 
of class-based Equal Protection. 
However, the creative conception will not be readily accepted in the courts: As I 
explain in Section C, courts have ignored and will continue to ignore the creative 
conception because it draws too subtle a distinction between status and speech. Courts are 
content to rest on the simple proposition that gay people can be gay without saying so. 
The law’s recognition of only an out/closeted binary, and not the continuous nature of 
coming-out, is further evidence that it will never articulate a creative conception. No 
courts have validated this conception of self-identifying speech,117 and I predict that none 
will. 
 
A. How Speech Creates 
Hunter has said that “[s]elf-identifying speech does not merely reflect or 
communicate one’s identity; it is a major factor in constructing identity.”118 More than 
that, she suggests that “[gay i]dentity cannot exist without it. . . . [because] expression is a 
component of the very identity itself.”119 Neither Hunter nor many of those who cite her 
elaborate on this complex proposition,120 and the process by which speech can create 
identity is not immediately obvious. But we can understand her assertion as resting on the 
idea that “[identity] encompasses explanation and representation of the self.”121 Like 
every identity, homosexuality is at once private orientation and social role.122  
In representing herself as gay, an individual does not only changes the way she is 
publicly perceived.123 Public (exterior) representation is not merely the presentation of a 
                                                 
117 Although in Dale v. Boy Scouts, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Handler recognizes the 
illocutionary aspect of gay self-identification, he ultimately suggests that it isn’t legally significant. See 
Dale v. Boy Scouts, 160 N.J. 562, 639 (N.J. 1999) (explicitly recognizing that “the statement ‘I am gay’ is 
illocutionary.”) (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: 
The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 550 (1998)).  
118 Nan Hunter, Speech and Equality, supra note 42, at 1718. 
119 Id. 
120 See, e.g., N. Nicole Endejann, Note, Coming Out is a Free Pass Out: Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, 34 AKRON L. REV. 893, 913 (2001) (“Self-identifying speech . . . is crucial to constructing one's 
identity or status.”) (citing Hunter, supra note 42, at 1718); Dale v. Boy Scouts, 160 N.J. at 639-40 
(Handler, J., concurring) (quoting Hunter, supra, at 1718); see also Alan B. Handler, Judging Public 
Policy, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 301, 317 (former Associate Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court suggesting 
that Nan Hunter’s proposition “supported the court’s determination that Boy Scouts' decision to exclude 
him based on his self-identification as a gay man amounted to status discrimination”).  
121 Nan Hunter, Speech and Equality, supra note 42, at 1696. 
122 Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 117 (2002) (“[S]ocial 
constructionists approached homosexuality as a social role, rather than a discrete identity”). Scholars such 
as Kenji Yoshino have explicitly recognized the difficulty in defining gay identity. See Kenji Yoshino, 
Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1834 
n.3 (1996). He defined “gay identity” to “mean nothing more than the shared experience of having a sexual 
attachment to persons of the same sex and the oppression experienced because of that attachment.” Id.  
123 Eve Sedgwick tells a story of two best friends, one male, one female, which illustrates how 
shifts in this public representation can influence even the most private relationships. (The story is also 
striking for the near absence of a descriptive aspect to the self-identification, in that the woman already 
knew that “the man’s eroticism happen[ed] to focus exclusively on men.”) EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGEWICK, 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 4 (1990). Sedgwick notes that: 
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predeveloped (interior) identity, but a continuous dialogue with society that shapes that 
identity. As Halley, an advocate of a creative conception, has said, “Social agents work 
with social meaning”124—in other words, gay self-identification establishes a 
representation available for social interpretation.125 As individuals we are instinctively 
aware of the import identity revelation, of the fact that “an individual interprets himself to 
a world interpreting him.”126 This is why, for example, instead of a teenager offering to 
the world the truest representation of her current identity (i.e., sexually confused), she 
will often offer the identity she wants to occupy (i.e., homosexual)—sensing that, by 
perceiving her in a specific way, society will help her realize her desired identity. 
Central to the idea that self-identification is creative is the realization that gay 
self-identification is a continuous process. The continuous need to self-identify to 
colleagues, friends, and acquaintances both establishes an exterior representation, and 
affects an individual’s interior gay identity.127 Marjorie Rowland, for example, self-
identified as gay on multiple occasions: to a secretary, an assistant principal, and several 
teachers; long before that, of course, she self-identified to the woman who became her 
partner.128 Each of these steps was generative of her personal gay identity. Coming out 
cannot be captured by a simple binary of “closeted” or “out,” because “coming out of the 
closet is not an all-or-nothing matter.”129 
Kenji Yoshino explains how this “representation” of sexual identity is tied to, and 
constitutive of, its “essence.” Building off the work of Judith Butler, Yoshino espouses a 
weak performative model of identity, in which identity is created through acts.130 
Specifically, he suggests that one’s interior homosexual identity may be “created not 
through single acts, but through a set of infinite and infinitesimal acts on the part of the 
individual and those around her.”131 For example, in the public employee context, 
conversations about family or dating, attendance at work-related social gatherings, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
[I]t was only after one particular conversational moment, fully a decade into this relationship, that 
it seemed to either of these friends that permission had been given to the woman to refer to the 
man, in their conversation together, as a gay man. . . . even in the context of years and years 
beforehand of exchange predicated on the man’s being gay.  
Id. The woman in this story had permission to call her friend “gay” only after he “use[d] about 
himself the phrase ‘coming out’—to mention, as if casually, having come out to someone else.” Id. The 
man’s self-identifying speech to another individual helped create his gay public identity with respect to this 
friend.  
124 Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 934 (1989). 
125 Id. at 934 (distinguishing between the “essence of sexual orientation” and “the representation 
of it available for social interpretation.”).  
126 Id. at 953. 
127 Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, in FORMS 
OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 239, 250-51 
(Edward Stein ed. 1990) (describing sexual identity as “a complex developmental outcome, the 
consequence of an interactive process of social labeling and self-identification”). 
128 Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984). 
129 William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and 
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2453 (1997). 
130 Yoshino, supra note 1, at 868 (weak performative model as suggesting that identity is 
culturally dependent since the biological component of an identity, such as sex, is unknowable and so “we 
can only apprehend it through culture”). 
131 Yoshino, supra note 1, at 874. 
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pictures of a partner at work are just a few examples of what might influence the way an 
employee conceives of her homosexuality. 
 
B. Constitutional Protection for Status Creation  
In contesting their termination for self-identifying as gay, plaintiffs often allege 
two distinct sorts of discrimination, first “against homosexuals” and “further . . . against 
‘manifest’ homosexuals.”132 The former is an accusation of complete exclusion, the latter 
of an enforced passing regime in which employees are dismissed for self-identifying as 
gay. A creative conception challenges this distinction more directly than either a 
descriptive or a persuasive one, suggesting that because self-identifying speech in part 
constitutes identity, a public employee’s dismissal for gay self-identification is one 
element of a larger regime of suppression which threatens the very identity itself. 
Under a creative conception, restrictions on gay self-identifying speech should 
find constitutional protection under a combination of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Coming out is creative in part because it contradicts the identity a 
heterosexual presumption would otherwise create. We might think of the First 
Amendment prohibition on coerced speech as constitutional protection for the means of 
identity creation. Self-identification should also find constitutional protection under the 
classification strand of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause—what we 
might think of as constitutional protection for the end result of identity creation. Because 
at any given point an individual’s gay identity is both existent and its creation is ongoing, 
both of these threads together form the basis for protecting self-identification. 
1. The First Amendment’s Prohibition on Coerced Identity Speech 
The default sexual message spoken for every individual is heterosexuality—what 
Adrienne Rich has termed “compulsory heterosexuality”133 and Michael Warner has 
called “heteronormativity.”134 This message is visible everywhere, from advertisements 
to literature and politics, and infuses our daily interactions with other people.135 There is 
reason to believe this message may be stronger in the workplace, the military, and public 
                                                 
132 Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 465 
(Cal. 1979). 
133 “The lie of compulsory female heterosexuality today afflicts . . . every profession . . . every 
organizing attempt, every relationship . . . .” Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian 
Experience, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 177 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983) 
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HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Michael Kimmel ed. 2003) (“[H]eteronormativity extends far beyond the 
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desire”); see also Eskridge supra note 129 (“conforming to compulsory heterosexuality harms those living 
it by giving their lives a mark of inauthenticity, disrupting their relationships with others, and hurting those 
whom they marry or otherwise implicate in the lie.”) 
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schools—historically sites of heterosexual male dominance—and that in those 
environments, the power to name oneself accurately is especially significant. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “one important manifestation of the 
principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to 
say.’”136 In Hurley, the Supreme Court upheld a St. Patrick’s Day parade organizer’s 
right to prevent members of a gay Irish group from marching in the parade under their 
own banner. The Court held that the parade organizers in Hurley could “remain[] silent” 
on the specific message of homosexuality by banning the “Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual 
Group” signs from their parade.137 
The Hurley Court affirmed the broader principle of the right of a private speaker 
to avoid coerced expression. But homosexuals who are barred from self-identifying are 
subject to coerced expression every day. Our heteronormative culture presumes that 
every person is straight. Thus, when individuals are prevented from declaring their 
homosexuality, they are in fact being forced to express, through their silence, a message 
of heterosexuality.138 To remain “silent” about heterosexuality, then, a gay person must 
be able to proclaim her homosexuality. The Court has recognized that the ability to 
remain silent encompasses the right to express a dissenting view. In Wooley v. 
Maynard,139 the Court found that the mere display of New Hampshire’s “Live Free or 
Die” state motto on the license plate of a plaintiff who objected to its message offended 
the First Amendment “right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the 
majority.”140 Wooley clearly encompasses a right to passive dissent—that the plaintiff’s 
could simply remove a message from their license plate. But it also encompasses a right 
to active dissent: While they were not allowed to replace the words “Live Free or Die” 
with a phrase of their own choosing, the plaintiffs, having removed the sign, were free to 
use a bumper sticker to then express their own message without interference. Yet, in this 
scenario there are two distinction options.  
A gay person cannot erase the message “I am straight” without also adding in the 
message “I am gay”—unlike in Wooley, the distinction between active and passive 
dissent collapses. In this light, we can understand why Judges and scholars have 
explicitly extended the reasoning in Hurley and Wooley to gay self-identification. The 
First Amendment protection of the negative right to be free from coerced identity speech 
itself requires identity speech. Five Ninth Circuit judges recognized that, in the context of 
the military’s DADT policy, “silence . . . can lead others to presume that [homosexuals] 
assent to a view about their own sexuality that they do not espouse,” namely that they are 
                                                 
136 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (quoting 
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137 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574; see also Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 475 U.S. at 16 (“[F]or 
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heterosexual.141 Scholars have argued that homosexuals have a right to avoid sanctioning 
the majority’s view of sexuality and instead express a different view.142 
The link between self-identification and status implies that a homosexual high 
school student’s Brad Matthewson’s “Gay Pride” t-shirt is significant in a way that a 
heterosexual friend’s “Straight Pride” t-shirt is not. The straight student lives against the 
background of the culture’s presumption of heterosexuality, which his t-shirt merely 
reinforces; by contrast, the gay student’s shirt is an act of self-differentiation and identity 
creation.143 Courts, however, have reached the opposite result—in Chambers v. Babbitt, a 
federal district court upheld a heterosexual’s right to where a “Straight Pride” shirt,144 
while courts have found against gay students like Matthewson.145 Courts are correct only 
in their initial realization that a distinction is justified—the negative First Amendment 
right against coercion asserted when a gay student wears a self-identifying shirt is 
fundamentally different from the affirmative right to identity speech asserted when a 
straight student does so. For Matthewson, unlike his hypothetical straight friend, the shirt 
is more than just “attire that reflects [his] political beliefs”146—it reflects, and constitutes, 
his identity itself.  
The coercion at issue when suppressing gay self-identifying speech is even more 
basic than that in conventional coerced-speech cases. In Wooley, the Court characterized 
the harm as forcing an individual’s property—the respondent’s car—“to be an instrument 
for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable,” 
effectively “a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message.”147 In the case of 
coerced sexual identity speech, however, it is the individuals themselves who are 
commandeered as a “mobile billboard” for heterosexuality. The coerced-identity message 
co-opts not property, but a person. Prohibitions on the co-opting of an individual’s body 
lie at the very core of substantive due process; as Laurence Tribe has stated, “the concept 
of privacy embodies the ‘moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not to 
others.’”148 The intersection between speech and personhood can be simply illustrated by 
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wear a sweatshirt with the message “Straight Pride”).  
145 See discussion supra note 95 (upholding the decision by high school administrators to prevent a 
student from wearing an “I’m gay, I’m proud” t-shirt). 
146 Motion to dismiss at *6 (emphasis added).  
147 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). In Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities 
Commission, another seminal coerced-speech case, the Court prohibited the state commission from forcing 
the company to include messages that it opposed in its billing envelopes, another form of property. Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 475 U.S. 1 (plurality) (vacating a lower court decision which 
forced Pacific Gas to include in its billing envelopes political views which it opposed). 
148 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 15-1 at 1302 (2d ed. 1988) (citing 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetiricians & Gynecologists, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2187 n.5 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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imagining that an individual functions as a billboard—and has a right to display her own 
message.  
The harm of coerced expression is standardization, but not just standardization of 
speech. Landmark free speech cases that, on the surface, dealt with issues of pure speech 
have been animated by similar fears of some deeper standardization.149 In announcing the 
First Amendment standard for the suppression of obscene material, the Court in Miller v. 
California decried the “the absolutism of imposed uniformity.”150 However, the Court 
was not referring to uniformity with respect to speech, but rather with respect to “tastes 
and attitudes” regarding sexually explicit material.151 In West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette, the Court struck down under the First Amendment a law requiring 
all children to say the Pledge of Allegiance. Justice Jackson denounced the law as a 
“[s]truggle[] to coerce uniformity,”152 but his focus was those deeply personal sentiments 
of patriotism and nationalism, not the words themselves.153 
Though these sentiments are difficult to quantify, we can draw a parallel between 
these cases and sexual orientation. “I am gay” is more significant than other descriptive 
statements—for example, “I am hungry”—in the same way that the Pledge of Allegiance 
is more significant than a schoolhouse rhyme. Their significance lies in their relatively 
unique connection to an underlying identity: These words are, to quote Tribe, the way to 
“make the ‘statement’ . . . [of] a public identity,”154 whether of sexuality or of patriotism. 
2. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Mandate of Class-Based Equal Protection 
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government 
increasingly cannot discriminate based on gay status.155 Although the appropriate 
standard of review for sexual orientation under the Equal Protection Clause is still 
                                                 
149 The Establishment Clause is beyond the scope of the paper, though that clause’s very purpose 
is to prevent standardization of deeply held personal beliefs. Plaintiff’s have also brought Free Exercise 
challenges which turn exclusively on standardization. See, e.g., Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. 
Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999)  (objecting to school uniform policy on First Amendment Free Exercise 
grounds, because the “spirit of the anti-Christ . . . requires uniformity, sameness, enforced conformity” and 
“[the plaintiff] objects, on religious grounds, to the fact that . . . uniformity is required”). 
150 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (U.S., 1973) (articulating a “community standards” 
conception because “[p]eople in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to 
be strangled”). 
151 Id. at 33. 
152 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943). 
153 Id. at 641 (“The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure but 
because the flag involved is our own.”). For this Court, these invisible principles were arguably the most 
important defining aspects of personhood. Endo and Korematsu, decided one year after Barnette, were 
obsessed with loyalty, “a matter of the heart.” 
154 TRIBE, supra note 148, § 15-1 at 1303 (“[O]ne reason that rights of privacy cannot be confined 
to John Stuart Mill’s category of activities having impact only on the actor is that freedom to have impact 
on others—to make the ‘statement’ implicit in a public identity—is central to any adequate conception of 
the self.”). 
155 Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 203, 
217 (1996) (suggesting, through by analyzing the Romer opinion in light of the Constitution’s No Bill of 
Attainders Clause, that Romer prohibits a government action that “impermissibly singles out persons for 
disfavored treatment based on their [queer] status”). It is also noteworthy that the Court has long disfavored 
criminalization on the basis of “status.” See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1962) (striking 
down a law criminalizing the status of being a drug addict). 
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contested,156 rather than revisit those arguments I suggest that gay-status-based 
discrimination fails even the lowest tier of scrutiny. A tenet of rational basis is to ensure 
that “classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened 
by the law.”157 The Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans158 establishes a legal presumption 
that a law or practice that classifies on the basis of gay status has as its purpose the 
disadvantaging of homosexuals. In Romer, the Court struck down Colorado’s antigay 
Amendment 2 because it was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In 
finding it constitutionally irrational, the Court emphasized both that the amendment 
targeted a “class of persons”159 and that it was based on animus.160 These dual 
observations are closely intertwined: The Court’s conclusion that Amendment 2 was 
based on animus largely followed from the fact that it broadly targeted homosexual 
status.161  
By analogy, a public employment decision explicitly based on homosexual status 
and nothing more should similarly fail rational basis review because it is necessarily 
grounded in animus.162 There is no legitimate cost-saving reason to deny homosexuals 
employment. (Although under a persuasive conception limiting the disruption caused by 
the presence of a gay employee arguably increases efficiency—and is thus cost-
effective—this reasoning ultimately validates the animus which underlies that disruption, 
rendering it illegitimate.163) Negative public employment decisions based on homosexual 
status are thus unconstitutionally irrational.164  
                                                 
156 Some scholars have struggled to define the appropriate standard of review after Lawrence. See, 
e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1528, 
1529 (recognizing that post-Lawrence, “[c]ourts may be reluctant to . . . [apply] upper tiers of Equal 
Protection review, but the extreme deference of old-fashioned rational basis review has now been 
complicated by the Court's recognition that at least some adverse treatment of gay people is invidious and 
disfavored.”). Others reject the tiers of scrutiny altogether for homosexuals. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, 
Foreward: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (“Gay rights cases ‘just can’t be steered 
readily onto the strict scrutiny or the rationality track’ . . . .”). Some even assume, without explanation, that 
Lawrence adopted an ordinary rational basis standard. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Morgan, Adopting Lawrence: 
Lawrence v. Texas and Discriminatory Adoption Laws, 53 EMORY L.J. 1491, 1491 (“Lawrence v. Texas 
decreed that the State of Texas had failed to offer a rational basis for its statutory prohibition of 
homosexual sodomy.”) (footnote omitted). 
157 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (U.S. 1996) (emphasis added) (citing Railroad Retirement 
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
158 517 U.S. 620, 633 (U.S. 1996). 
159 Id. at 633; see also id. at 632 (the amendment “impos[es] a broad and undifferentiated 
disability on a single named group”) (emphasis added). 
160 Id. at 632. 
161 The Court notes that the fact “the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class 
of persons,” Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, is “related,” id., to its characteristic of imposing an “undifferentiated 
disability on a single named group,” id. at 632. 
162 But cf. Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (1998) (rejecting plaintiffs’ reliance on Romer 
and Cleburne in challenging “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” on grounds that “cannot survive even rational basis 
review because it is motivated by irrational fear and prejudice toward homosexuals,” but doing so only 
because “[t]hose cases did not arise in the military setting.”). 
163 Cf. discussion supra Part II, Section B (arguing that suppressing gay self-identification for 
being disruptive is equivalent to condoning anti-gay prejudice). 
164 See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Enda Before it Starts: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Availability of Damages Awards to Gay State Employees under the Proposed Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 29-36 (2002) (suggesting that workplace status-based 
sexual orientation discrimination cannot ever be rationally related to a legitimate state interest).  
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If the classification strand of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause protects gay status, so too must it protect the speech acts that constitute that status. 
Suppressing the creative aspect of gay self-identification prevents the creation of gay 
identity. According to the creative conception, the purpose of condoning such 
suppression can only be to reduce the prevalence of the underlying status. When 
compared with laws or practices that burden status itself, burdening status creation is, if 
anything, more clearly animus-driven: Rather than penalizing the disfavored status, it 
eradicates it. Under a creative conception, gay self-identifying speech should be protected 
under the classification strand of the Equal Protection Clause.  
 
C. The Inadequacy of the Creative Conception 
Since the inception of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” courts have both been presented 
with and refused to acknowledge the creative conception. The military’s stated goals for 
the policy are to “promote[] unit cohesion, enhance[] privacy and reduce[] sexual 
tension.”165 These ends were clearly achieved by the military’s pre-1993 categorical ban, 
which purported to assure servicemembers that they were not serving alongside 
homosexuals. Yet it is more difficult to rationalize DADT as serving these ends. While 
homosexuals have always served in the military,166 DADT facially acknowledges and 
condones the presence of invisible gay servicemembers. In contrast to visibly gay 
servicemembers, invisible ones—whether on the battlefield, in the barracks, or in the 
showers—would seem to constitute a greater threat to military’s stated goals.  
Only through a creative conception can we understand the government’s 
insistence, and courts’ acceptance, that the military’s goals of privacy and unit cohesion 
can be furthered simply by silencing the communication of sexuality. As Yoshino 
observes, by silencing speech the military believes it is also in some sense erasing the 
homosexual from its ranks: “Blocking gays from expressing their identity in any way 
leads to their ontic erasure in the minds of straights and possibly in the minds of gays as 
well.”167 
Why do courts at once accept the reasons given by the military, but fail to 
acknowledge the theory that appears to underlie them? There are two central reasons. 
First, the creative conception depends on the continuous nature of coming-out which the 
law does not recognize. Second, the creative conception is grounded in a very subtle 
distinction between status and speech—and courts’ refuse to acknowledge such a 
conception because they draw a sharp distinction between status and speech.  
1. Absence of Legal Recognition of the Continuous Nature of Coming-Out 
That the continual nature of gay self-identification is not recognized by the law 
may be one reason why the law has failed to validate a creative conception. The creative 
conception, grounded as it is in the generative power that repeated acts of coming-out 
have on an individual’s sexual identity, requires recognition of the continuous nature of 
                                                 
165 Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir. 1998) 
166 See Thomas, supra note 88. 
167 Yoshino, supra note 90, at 549. 
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self-identification. Yet courts have understood “coming out” as a sudden transition from 
public to private. In articulating why a woman’s sexuality was private under the First 
Amendment, a California court reasoned that she kept her identity “secret from all but her 
. . . closest friends.”168 Even as it acknowledged that the reality was more complicated, 
the court squeezes the plaintiff into its binary, in effect categorizing her as purely 
closeted.  
Similarly, in the case of Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co.,169 the court dismissed 
a gay man’s privacy suit against major newspapers for truthfully describing him as a 
homosexual, because his sexuality was known to “people in a variety of cities,” from 
frequenting gay bars, marching in gay parades, and associating with gay leaders. 
Although Sipple was not private about his sexuality in a conventional sense, he still 
referred to his homosexuality as a “private sexual orientation.”170 We can understand his 
meaning by realizing that he rigorously contained knowledge of his sexual orientation to 
the gay subculture. For decades in gay community, there has been de facto recognition of 
and respect for this limited “community” outness. Beginning in the 1960s, homosexuals 
began to congregate in gay bars,171 spaces that outed everyone within their four walls. 
And yet, in the early years of the gay rights movement, being identified as gay within a 
bar was described as freedom, shelter, and escape172—while being out in the heterosexual 
community was described as “potentially paralyzing social ostracism and professional 
ruin.”173 Homosexuals recognized and preserved this distinction, then and now, through a 
“convention of silence and deception”174—honestly discussing another’s sexual 
orientation only with lesbians or gay men.175  
2. The Legal Distinction Between Status and Speech 
While I have argued that “I am gay” serves performatively to constitute gay 
identity, the statement is not classically performative: It does not completely create gay 
status in the way, for example, “I promise” creates a promise. The proposition that gay 
individuals are gay even when they cannot, or choose not to, declare that identity is 
inescapable. Because coming out is not both quickly and completely constitutive of 
status, courts are unwilling to see it as constitutive of status at all.   
This sharp distinction between status and speech is most evident in decisions 
upholding the constitutionality of DADT. The Second Circuit in Able v. United States, 
                                                 
168 Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772-73 (Ct. App. 1983) (female transsexual’s 
status was private under the First Amendment). 
169 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984). 
170 Id. at 667 
171 CLENDININ & NAGOURNEY, supra note 17, at 17. 
172 Id. at 18 (“[T]o young gay males trying to find the missing context of their lives, what a gay bar 
promised was much more: freedom, shelter, friendship, excitement, romance, seduction—escape.”). 
173 William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and 
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2444 (1997). 
174 David L. Chambers & Steven K. Homer, Honesty, Privacy, and Shame: When Gay People Talk 
About Other Gay People to Nongay People, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 255, 258 (1997). However, this 
convention may be disappearing. Id. at 261 (“Eventually, perhaps, the convention may disappear because 
all straight people will be supportive or nonthreatening . . . .”). 
175 Id. at 260. 
 32
even after assuming for the purpose of its analysis that the discharge of a servicemember 
based on homosexual orientation would be unconstitutional,176 refused to find the 
statute’s burden on the gay self-identification of five servicemembers unconstitutional.177 
The court stubbornly avoids even addressing the link between coming-out speech and gay 
status. Instead, the Able court characterizes speech as evidence of conduct,178 and claimed 
conduct was the sole basis for discharge.179 Further, the court maintains a firm distinction 
between conduct and status, noting that the military’s policy “does not bar those who 
have a homosexual orientation but are not likely to engage in homosexual acts.”180 The 
Able court perceives speech and conduct as related—that the first creates a propensity for 
the second—but refuses to acknowledge either’s link to status.  
Courts will not adopt a creative conception due to their unwillingness, as 
illustrated by Able, to further aggregate speech and identity. An exclusively creative 
model of gay self-identification blurs description with advocacy. Legal theorists who 
espouse a creative conception fault current law for “falsely disaggregating viewpoint 
from identity,”181 recognizing that “[c]onstitutional law has made a mess of the 
relationship between expression and equality.”182 An exclusively creative model would 
respond to the problem of false disaggregation by too heavily aggregating speech and 
identity.  
To use Austin’s example, the statement “There is a bull in the field” is potentially 
creative in the sense that it brings into being a warning—to encourage the listener to 
avoid strolling in the field.183 However, the statement only creates a warning because of a 
shared understanding between speaker and listener that bulls are dangerous. The 
statement acts as creative by invoking—and thus validating—certain commonly held 
views about bulls. Put more broadly, a statement that creates a warning often validates 
and reinforces all those conceptions underlying the speaker’s need to warn and the 
listener’s ability to perceive the warning.  
If gay self-identifying speech is to create gay identity, it must necessarily evoke 
the speaker’s desire to have such an identity and, thus, the identity’s desirability more 
generally. As the listener of “There is a bull in the field” can only understand the 
statement as a warning by recalling his own conception of bulls as dangerous, the listener 
of “I am gay” can only understand the statement as identity-creating by reflecting on her 
conception of gayness as a desirable identity. More than stating that gay is, period, this 
reinforces a notion that “Gay is good.” In doing so, it validates a number of positive 
views about sexuality.  
                                                 
176 Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1297 n.10 (2d Cir. 1996). 
177 Id. at 1299. 
178 Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1299 (2d Cir. 1996) (labeling speech and “indicator of 
propensity to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.”); id. at 1298 (“[T]he evidentiary value of the admission 
[“I am gay”] is strongly linked to what it is used to prove: a likelihood of engaging in homosexual acts.”). 
179 Id. at 1298 (“All three grounds for discharge are anchored in the need for a homosexual act, or 
at least the likelihood of such an act, before the member can be discharged.”). 
180 Id.; id. at 1299 (“Congress intended to move away from the emphasis on homosexual 
orientation under the former policy and to substitute an act-based policy in its place.”). 
181 Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note 42, at 21. 
182 Id.  
183 AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 33.  
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As a result of courts’ failure both to recognize the continuous nature of coming-
out, and their desire to preserve a firm distinction between status and speech, they have 
and will continue to refuse to recognize a creative conception. Although the creative 
conception is in theory capable of providing complete constitutional protection for self-
identifying speech, it is in fact unsuited. Scholars should look beyond the creative 
conception in searching for an alternative to the judicially dominate persuasive 
conception.  
 
IV. The Descriptive Conception of Gay Self-Identifying Speech in Law 
 
Essentially absent from the dialogue about gay self-identifying speech is a legal 
approach to gay self-identification as simple descriptive speech: coming-out speech’s role 
as identity-reporting. Yet speech is the primary way for homosexuals to communicate 
their minority status. It is, as five Ninth Circuit judges have recognized, simply “a 
statement  . . . which is truthful.”184 To focus on this aspect of the declaration is to 
conceive of gay self-identification like any ordinary descriptive statement. Under this 
model, to use the words of Justices Brennan and Marshall, an individual’s self-identifying 
“‘speech’ perhaps is better evaluated as no more than a natural consequence of her sexual 
orientation,” rather than the opposite.185 This is less ambiguous than a focus on either the 
creative or persuasive effects of identification: As Austin himself observes, in contrast to 
the creative or persuasive effects, “judges should be able to decide, by hearing what was 
said, what locutionary [descriptive] . . . acts were achieved.”186 By comparison, the 
preceding Parts illustrate that even specialized scholars cannot agree on the precise nature 
of the creative or persuasive effects. 
But surprisingly few judicial opinions have adopted a descriptive conception of 
self-identification. The dissent in Rowland arguably did so in recognizing that the self-
identifying speech of Marjorie Rowland, and “[s]peech it was,” was unique in that “[i]t 
revealed [her] status as a homosexual.”187 Similarly, in his concurring opinion for the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Dale, Justice Handler specifically took up the question of 
“the significance of the connection between [Dale]’s speech and his identity when both 
relate to his sexual orientation.”188 Although he recognizes the creative value of self-
identification, he sees its legal importance as its ability to communicate status 
information:189 
                                                 
184 Holmes v. California Army Nat’l Guard, 155 F.3d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir. 1998). 
185 dissent from denial of cert 
186 AUSTIN, supra note 5. 
187 Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“In 
stating that they are homosexuals, individuals ‘have done no more than acknowledge . . . their status.’”). 
188 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Amer., 160 N.J. 562, 625 (N.J. 1999). 
189 Although Justice Handler explicitly rejects legally characterizing self-identification as creative, 
at least one scholar suggests that he does just that. See Andrew R. Varcoe, The Boy Scouts and the First 
Amendment: Constitutional Limits on the Reach of Anti-Discrimination Law, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY 163, 
231 (2000) (observing, without further comment, that “Justice Handler quoted scholars who argue that gay 
or lesbian self-identification . . . realizes or constructs identity”). 
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[T]he relevance of self-identifying speech is not so much in realizing identity, as 
in its singular role in revealing identity. The importance of self-identifying speech 
inheres in its legal effect—that is, in the functional capacity of such speech to 
disclose or clarify the status of a person when that status is entitled to protection 
against discrimination.190  
 
Justice Handler, unlike other courts which adopt a descriptive conception, 
recognizes the crucial function of descriptive self-identification as identity-reporting. In 
Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the California Supreme 
Court found that a public utility unconstitutionally “discriminates . . . against persons 
who identify themselves as homosexual.”191 Yet the court compared that revelation to a 
disclosure by an employee that he “read books prohibited by the utility, visited countries 
disapproved by the utility, or . . . exhibited irrelevant characteristics of personal 
appearance . . . disliked by the utility.”192 The Pacific Telephone court clearly adopts a 
descriptive conception of self-identification: The parallel examples it mentions are 
neither creative—the statements “I read Hamlet” or “I visit England” do not serve, in a 
significant way, to create identity—nor persuasive—it is hard to imagine political 
consequences affixing to them. And yet—as suggested by its comparison to statements 
about taste in books, travel, or grooming—the court reads “I am gay” as an insignificant, 
neutral description (of same-sex sexual object preference). It fails to ascertain that the 
importance of descriptive status-revelation inheres in the status itself. 
As Justice Handler warned in his concurring opinion in Dale, “Self-identifying 
speech . . . is always vulnerable to misinterpretation and misunderstanding based on 
stereotypes that are associated with the speaker’s status.”193 Exclusively creative and 
persuasive conceptions classify as “speech” a message of advocacy that is sometimes 
neither intended nor even conceived of by the speaker,194 without recognizing the 
alternative that she might merely be describing. By contrast, the descriptive aspect 
acknowledges that gay self-identification is not always affirming, an acknowledgement 
that comports more closely with reality. This collapse of speech and advocacy is one of 
the problems with an exclusively persuasive or creative conception of self-identification 
that I highlighted above.  
Consider that some individuals self-identify as gay in order to publicly state their 
disapproval of homosexuality.195 Such an individual’s self-identification clearly does not 
                                                 
190 Dale v. BSA, 160 N.J. 562, 640 (N.J. 1999) (emphasis added). 
191 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488 (Cal. 1979). The court ultimately adopts articulates a perlocutionary 
conception of self-identification. Id. at 489. 
192 Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 492 (Cal., 1979) (adding that 
it“or simply exhibited irrelevant characteristics of personal appearance or background disliked by the 
utility.”) 
193 Dale v. BSA, 160 N.J. 562, 645 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler 
attempted to separate self-identification from advocacy. See Dale v. BSA, 160 N.J. 562, 642-43 (N.J. 1999) 
(Handler, J., concurring) (“Dale’s statement of his identity . . . does not express a view about 
homosexuality generally or specifically advocate that homosexuality is moral.”).  
194 It is a case of “[a]nother person . . . both articulating and hearing the supposed message.” James 
P. Madigan, Questioning the Coercive Effect of Self-Identifying Speech, 87 IOWA L. REV. 75, 94 (2001)  
195 See generally JOHN PAULK, NOT AFRAID TO CHANGE (1996) (autobiographical account of a 
self-identified homosexual who disapproves of homosexuality and was able to change to heterosexuality). 
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constitute advocacy and suggests more generally that self-identification is a poor proxy 
for advocacy. Imagine a timid, confused gay adolescent who comes out to a friend, 
parent, or psychiatrist. When he is revealing his identity, his impetus is more likely fear 
or confusion than a desire to advocate. And while his words have some creative effect, 
that is not the dimension he is emphasizing or of which he is even aware. In this moment, 
the descriptive aspect of self-identification is ascendant. But an exclusively creative or 
persuasive model would wrongly attribute to every act of gay self-identification a 
message of advocacy. In so doing, the models provide a legal vehicle by which an 
audience’s views can be attributed to a speaker. They thus provide the legal means for 
expressive associations to ban openly homosexual members. (Collapsing identification 
with advocacy also discourages straight individuals from promoting gay rights, for fear of 
inadvertently self-identifying as gay.196)   
Under a descriptive conception, however, gay self-identifying speech serves 
primarily to reveal the speaker’s homosexual status. At first, such a conception seems 
thin in comparison to a creative or persuasive one. After all, “coming out” as gay or 
lesbian is an event which can “change[] your whole life”197 and which has been shown to 
impact physical198 and emotional199 health in direct and tangible ways. It is temping, as 
Nan Hunter does, to criticize a descriptive conception of gay self-identification for 
“indicat[ing] that such speech communicates literally nothing more than a label.”200  
But adopting a legal model of gay self-identification as descriptive does not 
trivialize that speech, which is constitutionally valuable for its central role in facilitating 
the political participation of homosexuals. That gay people are a cognizable minority 
class in our pluralist democratic system is a clear example of modern “identity politics” 
which “generate[s] claims based on shared identity characteristics.”201 That identity, 
however, is invisible—causing scholars like Bruce Ackerman to label homosexuals 
“anonymous” minorities. 
                                                 
196 See IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: HOW TO MOBILIZE 
SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS 6 (2005) (noting that gay advocacy creates a presumption of homosexuality). 
197 Eskridge, supra note 207, at 2439-40 (internal quotations omitted); see also Robert Lipsyte, A 
Major League Player’s Life of Isolation and Secret Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1999, at A1 (recounting the 
story of a closeted major league baseball player who “felt so alone” but after coming out “cannot remember 
when he has felt as free as he says he is beginning to feel now.”); Tobias Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, 
Free Speech, and the U.S. Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV 1141, 1143-44 
(1997) (coming out changes even simple conversations with close friends). 
198 Miriam Saphira & Marewa Glover, The Effects of Coming Out on Relationships and Health, 5 
J. LESBIAN STUDIES, no. 1/2, p. 183 (2001) (“Degree of outness and the average SF-36 scores indicated 
lower health scores for those who were least out.”) 
199 Eskridge, supra note 129, at 2443 (“The closet diminishes . . . mental health” and “obstructs the 
development of an emotionally healthy life.”); see also David Tuller, A New Dimension in Snapshot of Gay 
Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2002, at F7 (“In Minnesota . . . 31 percent of gay, lesbian and bisexual 
students had attempted suicide; in Massachusetts, 33 percent had tried cocaine compared with 7 percent of 
other students; and in Seattle, 9.2 percent had vomited or taken laxatives to lose weight in the previous 30 
days compared with 2.8 percent of students who were not gay.”). 
200 Hunter argues that without “acknowledge[ing] that self-identification is more than a label” it is 
impossible to answer the “most obvious hypothetical,” namely whether the KKK could be required to 
admit an African American.” Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note 42, at 28. The answer is simply that 
this standard hypothetical regarding a (presumably) visible status doesn’t fit into the discussion about self-
identification, required by invisible minorities.  
201 Id. at 1-2. 
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In Section A, I articulate the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
political participation under the Equal Protection Clause—the right to a “level political 
playing field.” In Section B, I explain how gay self-identification plays a crucial role in 
the political process and thus how its suppression implicates this right. This speech 
allows a minority group to achieve what I term “political legibility”—the transition from 
what Ackerman calls “anonymous and diffuse” to discrete and insular. This shift, 
contrary to the familiar language of Carolene Products, can be politically advantageous 
and thus representation-reinforcing.  
This model focuses primarily on the descriptive aspect because it necessarily 
takes the ability to self-identify as speech that simply reveals status. This revelation is a 
neutral part of the political process in that it is already available to (and constantly 
exercised by) every visible minority group—for example, racial minorities or women—
and many invisible or partially invisible ones—for example, religious minorities. For this 
reason, I argue that ensuring that homosexuals have the ability to self-identify is, to use 
John Hart Ely’s terminology, an issue of “procedural fairness.”202 Under a creative or 
persuasive conception, by comparison, self-identification becomes group advocacy—it is 
cast as political advocacy (of which there are many forms) rather than as the more 
fundamental gateway to participation.203 
At the outset, I will respond to the potential charge that this political process 
model actually relies on a creative conception in that self-identification creates 
discreteness. I concede that identification does “create” gay identity in the minds of 
listeners who are not familiar with an individual’s sexuality. However, this form of 
identity recognition is not completely equivalent to personal identity creation. Equating 
the two is akin to the mistake of collapsing gay passing (a closeted homosexual) with gay 
conversion (a homosexual-turned-heterosexual).204 
 
A. A Level Political Playing Field 
Many legal scholars have conceived of gay self-identification as political 
speech.205 This is in part due to their unspoken adoption of a persuasive or creative 
                                                 
202 ELY, supra note 39, at 87 (1980); see also id. (concerned with “ensuring broad participation in 
the processes and distributions of government”). 
203 The argument of course can be made that even closeted homosexuals can participate in the 
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See ELY, supra note 39, at 82 (describing virtual representation as “anathema to our forefathers”).  
204 See Yoshino, supra note 1.   
205 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accomodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay 
and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 122-23 (1998) (“Coming out is also a form of political 
action . . . .”); Brent Hunter Allen, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for an 
Expanded Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1994) (“homosexuality is today essentially a form 
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Politics: An Argument for Expanded First Amendment Protection of Homosexual Expression, 10 CORNELL 
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‘gay bashing,’ is a form of political expression.”); Bobbi Bernstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to 
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model. Strategically, the argument is savvy: The protection of political speech is central 
to the First Amendment.206 Others imply that self-identification is more than speech and 
constitutes a “political act,”207 but do not elaborate.  It seems clear that political advocacy 
is distinct from speech that affects the political process. While most scholars see gay self-
identification as the former, I will argue that, through the speech’s descriptive aspect, it is 
also the latter. 
In Evans v. Romer (Evans I),208 the Colorado Supreme Court specifically 
articulated a Fourteenth Amendment right to equal political participation. This was the 
first of two decisions that court issued on the constitutionality of Amendment 2 to the 
Colorado Constitution, which prohibited the state or any municipality from protecting 
against discrimination on the basis of homosexual status.209 The Evans I court, in 
determining that the amendment need be evaluated under strict scrutiny, “conclude[d] 
that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects the 
fundamental right to participate equally in the political process.”210  
The Evans I court analyzed four types of voting rights cases: those involving 
direct restrictions on the right to vote,211 voter reapportionment,212 restrictions on the 
ability of minority party candidates to be placed on the ballot,213 and restrictions on the 
ability of certain groups to have legislation implemented through the normal political 
process.214 The Evans court articulated the broader principle which unifies these voting 
rights cases: “[L]aws may not create unequal burdens on identifiable groups with respect 
to the right to participate in the political process absent a compelling state interest.”215  
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Supreme Court struck down an 
initiative which would have stripped from local school districts the power to impose 
mandatory busing as a way of desegregating schools. In Seattle School District, the Court 
                                                                                                                                                 
(“[L]itigators should employ . . . the political nature of coming out” and encourage “courts [to] recognize 
the freedom to come out as a fundamental part of the political struggle for equality.”). Hunter, Expressive 
Identity, supra note 42, 11 (arguing that “[c]ourts interpret descriptions of oneself as nonheterosexual as 
distinctly and primarily a political viewpoint.”). 
206 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (describing freedom of speech as 
“indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth”).   
207 Professor Eskridge has said that “coming out of the closet as a gay person is also an explicitly 
political act.” While recognizing that “[t]he anonymity of closeted homosexuals in the 1950s was key to 
their political marginalization” he does not provide a coherent theory to explain why. William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in 
American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2443 n.130. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 205, at 287 
(“[H]omosexuals as a group are handicapped by structural barriers that operate to make effective political 
participation unlikely if not impossible,” barriers erected by “pressures to conceal one’s homosexuality”) 
(quoting Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring)). 
208 854 P.2d 1270 (1993). 
209 Amendment 2 would have effectively repealed existing ordinances in Denver, Boulder, and 
Aspen, preventing certain forms of discrimination against homosexuals. Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 1277 
212 Id. at 1277-78 (discussing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). 
213 Id. at 1278 (discussing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) which struck down a series of 
Ohio statutes which "made it virtually impossible," for new political parties with widespread support to be 
placed on the state ballot to choose electors pledged to a specific candidate). 
214 Id. at 1279-82  (discussing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) and Washington v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)).  
215 Id. at 1279. 
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distinguished between “laws [which] make it more difficult for every group in the 
community to enact comparable laws”216 and those which only “mak[e] it more difficult 
for certain racial and religious minorities [than for other members of the community] to 
achieve legislation that is in their interest.”217 In generalizing the principle animating 
Seattle School District, the Evans I court noted that “the Fourteenth Amendment reaches 
political structures that ‘distort[] governmental processes in such a way as to place 
special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation.’”218 
Although some courts and commentators have stated otherwise,219 the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans—which affirmed the decision of the Colorado 
Supreme Court on other grounds—nowhere rejects the existence of a right to political 
participation. Indeed, Justice Kennedy implicitly acknowledges the right to political 
participation, saying that “[c]entral . . . to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal 
protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial 
terms to all who seek its assistance.”220 
 How do restrictions on self-identification implicate the right recognized in these 
cases—that of each citizen to equal political participation? It is the basis for what I will 
term their “politically legibility”: Self-identification allows a member of a minority group 
to report her minority status, ensuring that her presence can be readily ascertained by 
both political allies and opponents. This is not only advantageous—as a focus on the 
persuasive aspect would suggest—because the voices of homosexuals are more effective 
in arguing that “gay is good,” by persuading others of the need for gay rights legislation. 
Rather, through the descriptive aspect, by reporting the fact of an individual’s 
homosexuality this speech establishes simply that “gay is.” Because other minorities 
usually can be recognized by virtue of their corporeal visibility, such gay identity-
reporting increases the political influence of homosexuals so that they are on a level 
political playing field with other minorities. 
That visibility is politically advantageous for gay people today represents a 
startling shift. It is, after all, precisely through their ability to hide that homosexuals 
historically avoided restrictions imposed on racial minorities. When gay people had no 
political voice, invisibility was an advantage; yet in a political climate where gay people 
can and do exercise a political voice, their invisibility weakens that voice. Modern 
                                                 
216 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (U.S., 1982) 
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219 Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir., 1997) (“[T]he United States 
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existence of a fundamental constitutional right to participate in the political process.”). But cf. Keith E. 
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Structure Equal Protection, 27 Cap. U.L. Rev. 337, 380 (1999) (“Justice Kennedy’s Romer v. Evans 
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it.”).  
220 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (U.S. 1996); see also id. (“A law declaring that in general it 
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself 
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); id. at 631 (Amendment 2 is constitutionally problematic because as 
a result “[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”). 
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prohibitions on gay self-identification are a decisive deterrent to effective political 
participation by gay people, and they thus implicate the right to equal political 
participation.    
In Pacific Telephone, the California Supreme Court condemned an employer’s 
prohibition on self-identification because it “‘tend[s] to control or direct the political 
activities or affiliations of employees’ . . . [and] ‘to coerce or influence . . . employees . . . 
to . . . refrain from adopting [a] particular course or line of political . . . activity.’”221 In 
his concurring opinion in Watkins v. United States Army, Ninth Circuit Judge Norris 
echoes Pacific Telephone in calling the army’s prohibition on self-identification a 
“structural barrier[]” to the political effectiveness of homosexuals, arguing that 
“pressures to conceal one’s homosexuality operate to discourage gays from openly 
protesting anti-homosexual governmental action. . . . [and] [a]s a result, the voices of 
many homosexuals are not even heard, let alone counted.”222  
The fear articulated by these courts is that prohibitions on gay self-identification 
may result in certain individuals completely removing themselves from the political 
process. Indeed, there is reason to believe that closeted gay people will refrain from 
advocacy for fear of being outed, and that restrictions on self-identification, by keeping 
these individuals closeted, will reinforce an antigay regime.223 (In fact, the presumption 
of homosexuality which attaches to those who engage in gay advocacy may deter 
heterosexuals from pro-gay political participation as well.224) Yet these cases hint at a 
more subtle fear, which I take up in the next Section: not only that certain individuals will 
be discouraged from participating but that—because those individuals are closeted—the 
community as a whole will be less politically effective.  
 
B. The Right to Political Legibility 
A consequence of each gay individual’s ability to self-identity, in the aggregate, is 
the gay community’s ability to be a discrete and, as a result, an insular minority group. It 
is instructive to begin with footnote four of Carolene Products, which famously declares 
that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . 
                                                 
221 Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488 
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223 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 100 
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This fear is stronger in a legal regime that punishes coming-out, because such a regime increases 
the likelihood that any homosexual is closeted, and thus lends validity to the suspicion that a particular 
heterosexual advocate is. In a legal regime that imposes no punishment for self-identification, this effect 
will be reduced because the presumption that gay individuals are closeted will fall. 
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curtail[ing] the operation of the political process.” However, outright exclusion of 
minorities is no longer a major political distortion. As Ackerman notes, traits that are 
discrete—that is, visible—are no longer a “decisive disadvantage.”225 In fact, absent overt 
discrimination, minority groups in a pluralist political system are advantaged for the 
exact reasons that they were previously excludable: their discreteness and insularity.226 
Discreteness helps “form a well-organized lobby” by breeding solidarity,227 allowing 
effective social sanctions to be placed on free riders,228 reducing organizational costs (for 
example, by ensuring a dense intra-group communication network),229 and reducing the 
cost of selecting effective political leaders.230 
In Beyond Carolene Products, Ackerman suggests that from a democratic process 
standpoint, “groups that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ rather than ‘discrete and insular’” 
increasingly warrant Fourteenth Amendment protection.231 Homosexuals are anonymous 
minorities—those whose unifying characteristic is invisible.232 Homosexuals are also 
diffuse, whether we think of this characteristic as social or geographic, since 
homosexuality occurs with increased frequency in neither specific social nor geographic 
groups.233  
Many have mischaracterized homosexuals as insular, Ackerman included, 234 by 
failing to recognize that this insularity hinges on self-identification. Prior to self-
identification, homosexuality is an identity trait which occurs in a socially and 
geographically diffuse manner (uncorrelated, for example, with social or geographic 
factors such as socioeconomic status). As a result I call homosexuals naturally diffuse. 
For such groups, discreteness in some form is a necessary condition for insularity.  
While “discrete groups do not have to convince their constituents to ‘come out of 
the closet’ before they can engage in effective political activity,”235 homosexuals do. It is 
for this reason that anonymous and diffuse minorities “fail to achieve influence remotely 
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234 Id. at 729 (Homosexuals “may be somewhat insular.”); see also . Mad River Local School 
Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“homosexuals 
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235 Ackerman, supra note 225, at 731. 
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proportionate to their numbers.”236 Building off Albert Hirshman’s book Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty,237 Ackerman suggests that the political weakness of anonymous minorities stems 
from their dependence on the individual decision of each member to declare her group 
membership (voice) rather than stay silent and avoid prejudice (exit). Their political 
weakness is their dependence on members’ self-identification.  
Some suggest that invisibility is a political boon because invisible groups have are 
better able both to evade and to alter prejudice than visible ones.238 Yet this argument 
fails to distinguish between individual and group: While the benefits of invisibility accrue 
to the individual, those of visibility accrue to the community. On an individual level, 
stigma and discrimination potentially become more prevalent with visibility; for the gay 
community, visibility is desirable. Consider that some gay activists continue to wish that 
all gays would turn blue239—suggesting that they, at least, think that on net visibility is a 
political boon.   
A corporeal mark indicative of homosexuality is not just hypothetical: 
Throughout the 1980s, the purple sores of Karposi Sarcoma—which some termed a 
“scarlet H”—functionally revealed not only one’s HIV status, but one’s sexuality as 
well.240 Visibility forced HIV-positive individuals to confront the realities of their 
illness—not only medical, but social.241 As HIV-positive individuals became more 
visible, the positive community benefited: not only was the disease was acknowledged, 
and society educated as to its transmission, money toward both prevention and treatment 
markedly increased as well. So too would corporeal visibility make it harder for gays to 
ignore daily expressions of inequality.  
Homosexuals in many American cities are both visible and insular. To quote Ely, 
the crucial question is then “why the minority in question is discrete and insular.”242 The 
answer, in the case of naturally anonymous and diffuse minorities like homosexuals, is 
self-identifying speech. Thus it is anonymous and diffuse minorities that are most hurt by 
the suppression, or the chilling, of self-identification. For anonymous minorities, self-
revelatory speech is the key to achieving discreteness; for diffuse minorities it is the key 
to achieving insularity—and through these characteristic, establishing political legibility. 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court alluded to this special role 
of self-identification. In Dale, the Court confirmed and legalized, in the words of one 
scholar, a “broad popular understanding of the expressive power of the ‘avowed 
homosexual.’”243 The difference between otherwise similarly situated individuals who 
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declare themselves as straight and gay, respectively, is that the fact of their sexual 
identity, when made discrete, complements and colors all their other expressive 
disagreements. Consider the Dale Court’s reliance on the fact that “[t]he presence of an 
avowed homosexual” who disagrees with the Boy Scout’s message on sexual 
orientation “sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a heterosexual 
assistant scoutmaster who is [also] on record as disagreeing.”244 So while, as Justice 
Stevens emphasizes in his vigorous dissent, “an openly gay male is irreversibly affixed 
with the label ‘homosexual,’”245 he is in some sense exactly right. (As is an openly 
straight male is constantly irreversibly affixed with the label “heterosexual.”) Once 
vocalized, like race or sex, sexual orientation “communicates a message . . . wherever 
[one] goes”246—that message is the simple fact of one’s minority status, and allows 





It is now well understood that “coming out of the closet” is a term that applies to 
identities other than homosexuality.247 The value of coming-out speech is not unique to 
homosexuals, but rather extends to any anonymous minority.248 And invisible minorities’ 
dependence on self-identification is broader than scholars and courts have recognized—
such speech is important not only to persuade others of the need for equality, but to create 
one’s identity in the first place, and to describe its existence. When gay self-identification 
is restricted, these three dimensions—the creative, persuasive, and descriptive—are all 
suppressed. The suppression of each dimension of self-identifying speech corresponds to 
a different harm and, as a result, is necessarily met by a separate legal remedy.  
As I have shown, a focus on the persuasive aspect of speech—its effect on the 
thoughts and feelings of the audience—is dominant in most existing case law on gay self-
identifying speech. Courts hear “I am gay” as “We’re here, we’re queer, get used to it,” 
or “Gay is good.” Yet this dominant conception fail even in theory to completely protect 
gay self-identifying speech. The First Amendment’s public employee speech doctrine and 
the expressive association analysis present in Hurley provides a doctrinal framework for 
protecting such persuasive speech—but even when applied correctly, suppression is 
sometimes appropriate. 
Scholars have reacted against this focus on the persuasive by emphasizing that it 
wrongly ignores the creative dimension of self-identification—and it is the creative 
conception which is dominant in sexuality-and-law scholarship. Sexuality-and-law 
scholars hear “I am gay” as “I am out therefore I am.” The creative aspect of self-
identifying speech provides, in theory, a firm constitutional ground for protection: I 
suggest that we can understand the way that speech creates in light of compelled-
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affirmation case law, since coming out creates gay identity in part by contradicting the 
presumption of heterosexuality. Because self-identification in part creates gay status, and 
that status is itself protected under the Equal Protection Clause, the speech acts that 
constitute it should find protection under the Fourteenth Amendment even under a 
rational basis standard of review. However, such a conception fails in practice to protect 
self-identification: it is not now, nor will it ever be correctly applied by courts, because it 
depends on recognition of the continuous nature of coming-out, and because courts draw 
a firm distinction between speech and status.   
While judicially dominant, the persuasive conception fails to consistently protect 
self-identification; while theoretically absolute in its level of protection, the creative 
conception will not be adopted by the courts. However, there is a third, descriptive 
conception which has not received attention in current scholarship: the role of gay self-
identification in reporting an invisible identity. When the descriptive aspect of self-
identification is ascendant, “I am gay” is heard and intended as “I am gay.” The 
corresponding harm to the political process that results from the suppression of this 
aspect of gay self-identification has gone unrecognized. The descriptive dimension of 
self-identification implicates the gay individual’s right to equal political participation by 
allowing the gay community to achieve political legibility.  
The descriptive conception gives courts a more secure foundation on which to 
base protection for self-identifying speech. Unlike the persuasive and creative 
conceptions—which are unpredictable and wax and wane in importance depending on the 
context—the descriptive conception’s effect is always the same simple revelation of 
status information. Advocates and scholars should pay attention to this potentially 
promising approach. 
The question of the legal protection for self-identification is becoming even more 
important than it is today. Minority group members whose unifying characteristics we 
usually think of as discrete—such as race, gender, and nationality—must self-identify 
across certain high-tech mediums of interaction. In his article Cyberrace, Jerry Kang 
observes, for example, that “cyberspace can make racial anonymity easier”249 and can 
reduce social insularity by “increase[ing] the realm of communication partners with 
whom we interact.”250 As workplaces are increasingly spread across America and 
business takes place by phone or email, modern technologies, such as telephones or the 
Internet, are pushing many minority coworkers from discreteness to anonymity. 
As our daily encounters occur increasingly in such a (visually and physically) 
sterile context, the political legibility of visible minorities is decreasing. More minority 
groups will come to depend on self-identifying speech, will need to indicate—whether 
over a business-related conference call phone, an online educational chat session, or an 
interactive military training program—their race, gender, nationality, or sexual 
orientation. And when an employer responds that such self-identification is unnecessarily 
personal or disruptive, a robust understanding of its descriptive dimension and the harm 
which results from the suppression of that aspect, is crucial in articulating why such 
identification is the constitutional right of every minority.  
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